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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a policy analysis of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
Law Enforcement Deployment Team concept.  The concept outlines the need to form 
specialized regional law enforcement teams to be deployed across the nation to stricken 
regions.  As written, these teams are designed to provide a backfill to law enforcement 
agencies who require additional assistance post-natural disaster or post-terror attack.  
Many of the tenets in this DHS concept and derived from existing federal teams such as 
the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams and Urban Search and Rescue Teams. 
The concept also outlines how teams will be comprised, what their expected 
missions will be and the general vision for how they will be equipped, trained and 
transported.  However, analysis of this policy proposal showed the DHS concept does not 
provide a proposed structure or management organization to manage this potential 
national resource.  Additionally, it lacks detail on how teams would be monitored, 
administered, and readied for deployment.  This gap was the basis of this thesis project. 
The analysis of this condition starts by outlining the debate in law enforcement 
over the efficacy of centralized versus decentralized police structures.  A brief historical 
narrative of the origins of U.S. law enforcement and review of the literature was used to 
demonstrate the breadth of this debate.  Existing law enforcement management structures 
were reviewed to determine potential smart practices and to outline past errors to develop 
guideposts to be used in formulation of the law enforcement deployment team 
management system. 
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A.  PURPOSE 
Events such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005) and the LA Riots (1992) have 
provided practical examples of inadequate performance of the decentralized law 
enforcement structure in the United States in response to both natural and man-made 
disasters.  The results have highlighted the inability to mass a trained, synchronized 
civilian force at the right place and time to provide order and security after catastrophic 
events.  As a consequence, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the 
Major Cities Chiefs Association have proposed a concept termed the Law Enforcement 
Deployment Team (LEDT) to deploy forces from other departments to fill voids in law 
enforcement (LE) capacity in disaster areas.   
Given the array of increasing threats and the destructive level of natural disasters, 
the capability provided by the current organization structure of U.S. LE is questionable; 
specifically regarding the ability to provide an adequate response to catastrophic events 
that stretch across jurisdictions or to events that exceed the organic capabilities in a single 
jurisdiction.  Given these conditions, this project will seek, first of all, to explain why the 
U.S. LE structure has remained unchanged despite recent events; and secondly, to 
consider what management structure should be applied to the newly proposed LEDT 
concept to ensure it can effectively fill the void of depleted law enforcement in disaster 
scenarios.   
B. RELEVANCE 
After the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina and Rita disasters, the U.S. Senate 
noted that as a nation , the United States has not reacted to the lessons provided by these 
events to form a “large, well-equipped and coordinated law enforcement response to 
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maintain or restore civil order after catastrophic events.”1  Given the size of today’s 
population centers and the potency of terrorist and natural disaster threats that face the 
United States, this clearly is an area the nation should explore to determine the best way 
to achieve the necessary LE capability.   
In the current configuration of U.S. law enforcement, there are approximately 
17,000 jurisdictions, departments and agencies mostly comprised of small organizations.2  
In a disaster environment where the organic police force is no longer able to respond 
adequately. It is difficult at best to send a backup force to fill the vacuum of a depleted 
large department like New Orleans or Los Angeles when the backup force is 
geographically dispersed, small in number, lacking in resources, and capability and has 
been trained and equipped differently from the organization in need of relief.   
There has been an ongoing debate regarding the efficiency of the structure of U.S. 
LE extending decades into the past.  Before Hurricane Katrina, however, there had not 
been a watershed event large enough to lift the debate from academic and practitioner 
circles to one of political immediacy and necessity.  Traditionally, as problems have 
arisen in law enforcement, tactics and procedures have changed but not the structure 
itself.  It is important to understand despite the type of structure, centralized, 
decentralized or some other form, the aforementioned events would likely have occurred 
just as they did.  However, structure does matter in facilitating the LE response to 
manage the aftermath in the recovery phase and may have a significant impact on 
lessening the actual impact of the event.   
In a move to look at structures, the Department of Homeland Security in 
conjunction with the Major Cities Chiefs Association joined to study this problem and 
proposed a policy to inject LE capability into disaster areas. Their proposed solution is 
the LEDT.  This concept is predicated upon taking a predetermined amount of personnel 
                                                 
1 United States Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government, 2006), https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps03-050506-
01.pdf&code=ca2a7ac9a2c672fabcfcfbba9a6c1396 (accessed February 29, 2008). 
2 Ronald D. Hunter, “Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police,” Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 6, no. 205 (1990), 205, http://ccj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/4/205 
(accessed February 29, 2008). 
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from various participating police departments, packaging them as a combined team and 
forward deploying them and their requisite equipment to the location of the catastrophe to 
augment remaining civil law enforcement capability.3  This will be the first time in the 
history of U.S. LE that the country may achieve a standing non-military backup force to 
address mass disaster situations on a national level.  However, developing the 
management architecture to manage this force effectively on a daily basis as well as 
employ it in a coordinated fashion remains an unanswered question. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Practical Problem 
The current U.S. law enforcement apparatus may no longer be robust enough to 
respond to major national disasters as evidenced by the LE response during Hurricane 
Katrina.  To understand why the LEDT is being proposed as a solution, an understanding 
of the U.S. LE structure is necessary and requires a review of the debate regarding 
current decentralization versus centralization of the American police apparatus.  This 
background will serve to setup the problem the LEDT concept is trying to solve by 
providing an explanation of why the problem of massing synchronized civilian law 
enforcement capability exists at all.   
There are two camps regarding this structural argument within law enforcement, 
those who believe a centralized law enforcement structure should be avoided and those 
who believe decentralized law enforcement is inefficient and must be changed.  
Centralization versus decentralization of U.S. law enforcement has been a contentious 
subject for over eighty years as evidenced by the list of scholars and practitioners writing 
in this area.  Points supporting the maintenance of a decentralized force range from doing 
so because it is more symbolic of a democratic system, because states reserve the right to 
provide their own police services under the U.S. Constitution and because a large 
centralized national police force runs against tradition and appears un-democratic in 
                                                 
3 Major Cities Chiefs Association, Law Enforcement Deployment Teams (Washington, D.C.: National 
Terrorism Policy Center, FEMA, 2008), 4. 
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nature.  The merits of each of these and numerous other arguments for continued 
decentralization are debatable.  However, the fact remains; the American police apparatus 
does not provide the capability to inject a large force trained in civil law enforcement 
techniques rapidly to backfill or replace a severely degraded or overwhelmed organic 
force in disaster response.4  
America’s police traditions evolved from England’s village constable system and 
out of suspicion of a centralized police authority.5  As a result, the U.S. system is 
comprised of a network of villages where home rule has been largely protected by states’ 
rights as outlined by the tenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Practitioners and 
scholars alike back this camp.  From the law enforcement side, then Director of the FBI, 
J. Edgar Hoover, believed a centralization of law enforcement, brought on greater 
potentials for corruption and abuse of power and that cities had the means to conduct 
their own enforcement activities without need for a centralized force.6  From the legal 
perspective then Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: 
Acts which can only be justified on the grounds that they are police 
regulations, must be so clearly necessary to the safety, comfort, or well- 
being of society, or so imperatively required by public necessity, that they 
must be taken from the words of the constitution…7 
Scholars such as J.P. McIver and L. Wagner placed great assurances on local 
control and fragmented law enforcement authority.8  Crank and Langworthy noted that 
the new Community Policing program was actually a program to maintain a decentralized 
                                                 
4 Frances Frogos Townsend, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2006), 52, http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned/ (accessed April 29, 2008). 
5 John Edgar Hoover, “The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 291, New Goals in Police Management (January 1954), 39-45, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1030336 (accessed April 15, 2008); Charles Reith, “Comparative Systems of 
Law-Enforcement,” Transactions of the Grotius Society 31, Problems of Public and Private International 
Law, Transactions for the Year 1945 (1945), 156, http://www.jstor.org/stable/743276 (accessed April 15, 
2008). 
6 Hoover, The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement, 40. 
7 Glenn H. Reynolds and, David B. Kopel, “The Evolving Police Power,” Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly 511, (Spring 2000), http://davekopel.org/CJ/LawRev/EvolvingPolicePower.htm#FN;B12 
(accessed April 15, 2008). 
8 Hunter, Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police, 206. 
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status.9  Liebman and Polen argued that while the police structure is decentralized 
nationally due to private or community policing in early America, it is actually becoming 
centralized locally within the larger departments to obtain more capacity to act.10   
The viability of the decentralized police force has been studied and questioned 
over the past eighty years by leading experts such as “R.B. Fosdick, 1920; the National 
Commission of 1931; B. Smith, 1931; the President’s Commission, 1976A/B; Sutherland 
and Cressey, 1970; Wilson and McLaren, 1970; Berkeley, 1976; Tafoya, 1986; and 
Hunter, 1989 among others.”11  In his study of police forces throughout the world, David 
Bayley, a leading expert on police structure, notes forces are more likely to be centralized 
when they have a high mobilization demand or a violent resistance is expected; not unlike 
the response to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina or the LA Riots.12  Even practitioners 
have come to question the ills of decentralization as witnessed by former NYPD Police 
Commissioner Patrick Murphy, who wrote comments stating the small departments in the 
U.S. should be consolidated into larger departments as he questioned their viability as 
police agencies.13 
Despite academic research, numerous policy suggestions and national 
catastrophic events that all point toward a need for change, the U.S. LE structure remains 
largely unaltered since its inception.  The debate between the two camps has roots in 
effectiveness in basic organization structures and in political and legal culture; however, 
it appears through the literature more are beginning to question the viability of  
 
 
                                                 
9 Daniel E. Marks and Ivan Y. Sun, “The Impact of 9/11 on Organizational Development among State 
and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23, no. 159 (2007), 
163, http://ccj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/23/2/159 (accessed April 15, 2008). 
10 Robert Liebman and Michael Polen, “Perspectives on Policing in Nineteenth Century America,” 
Social Science History 2, no. 3 (1878), http://www.jstor.org/stable/view/1171135?seq=1 (accessed April 
15, 2008). 
11 Hunter, Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police, 205. 
12 David H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1985), 68. 
13 Patrick V. Murphy and Thomas Plate, Commissioner: A View from the Top of American Law 
Enforcement (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 43. 
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decentralized law enforcement as time goes on as evidenced in the previous paragraph.  
Despite the debate, the structure remains the same as no real steps have been taken to 
change it. 
After the Department of Defense encountered problems in joint warfare 
throughout the 1980s, the Goldwater – Nichols Act of 1986 brought sweeping changes to 
military organizations and structures to increase effectiveness.  Upon analysis of 
intelligence failures after the 9/11 attacks, organization and structure changes were 
brought to the intelligence community through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.  Post Hurricane Katrina, with the implosion of law enforcement 
services in New Orleans, Congress asked for a large and well equipped, coordinated law 
enforcement capability for the nation.14  Clearly, the United States has not seen the same 
sweeping changes in U.S. LE.  Further debate on the structure of U.S. LE is not without 
merit, but is unlikely to produce a system-wide change. 
2. Response 
Given the mixed record of LE to respond under new demands, DHS and local law 
enforcement leaders set out to acquire an advanced capability to respond through an 
innovative approach.  The proposed Law Enforcement Deployment Team (LEDT) 
concept is a new idea derived in 2007 in a working group of the Major Cities Chiefs 
Association in conjunction with the Major County Sheriff’s Association, the Department 
of Homeland Security, the FBI, ATF, the National Emergency Management Association 
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.15  The final proposal to DHS by this 
group was released in December of 2007 in the form of a single report.  There is little 
else in literature directly regarding this concept.  The crux of the information regarding 
the policy to be analyzed will come from the Law Enforcement Deployment Team report 
itself and interviews with the DHS lead for the program, Mr Charles Eaneff and Mr Rick 
Dinse, FEMA’s Chief Law Enforcement Coordination officer, as well as members of the 
Major Cities Chief’s Association as necessary.  
                                                 
14 United States Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 35. 
15 Major Cities Chiefs Association, Law Enforcement Deployment Teams, V. 
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3. Research Question 
Although one could question the efficacy of the LEDT concept itself, the purpose 
of this project is to answer what management structure should be applied to the newly 
proposed LEDT concept to ensure it can effectively fill the void of depleted law 
enforcement in disaster scenarios? To ensure the concept is executable and teams are able 
to deploy rapidly in response to a national disaster, additional work must be done to 
develop a management system robust enough to manage a national LEDT system.16  
Correlations can be made between the LEDT concept and the existing Urban Search and 
Rescue Teams (US&R) and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) as well as with 
the U.S. military and the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) deployment 
concept regarding force planning, packaging, requests for forces by the field, 
mobilization of teams and information preparation of deployment areas.  These are all 
areas on which the current LEDT concept is either thin or silent.  Academic literature is 
also thin to non-existent regarding an LEDT type concept and its employment.  
Consequently, reliance will be on governmental documents, reports, doctrine and 
operating instructions to perform an analysis to develop a recommended management 
system.   
The FEMA US&R teams are the local civilian arm of the nation’s Search and 
Rescue program.17  They were developed in 1990 because of Hurricane Hugo and the 
earthquake at Loma Prieta where it was noted a national response system was necessary 
to provide additional search and rescue services in a major disaster area that has 
overwhelmed existing resources.18  These conditions are very similar to the ones 
resulting in the call for a national LEDT system.  Before 1990, US&R teams existed 
throughout the nation mostly in local fire and sheriff’s departments; however, there was 
                                                 
16 Charles Eaneff, Interview by Author, May 2, 2008. 
17 U.S. Government, National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government, 2007), 4, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opr/nsarc/NSARC%20-
%20Natl%20SAR%20Plan%20(2007%20-%20Final.pdf (accessed May 6, 2008). 
18 Fred Endikrat, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding assessing the 
capabilities and coordination of federal emergency response teams, May 26, 2007, 
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070509150915-39826.pdf (accessed May 6, 2008). 
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not a national system to manage and deploy them to larger crises areas.  Although the 
teams are still locally owned as would be the case with the LEDTs, the US&R 
management system located within FEMA is used for coordination, maintenance and 
development of teams to respond nationally when federalized.19  Detailed review and 
analysis of this management system is necessary to aid in developing the LEDT 
management system, particularly in regards to team management and tracking, 
standardized policy and equipping and logistics management.  Additionally, lessons may 
be learned in the problem areas highlighted during a recent audit with this management 
system in areas of operational and logistics readiness, staffing, budget and team 
evaluation.20 
The National Medical Disaster System is designed to supplement state and local 
medical resources during disasters and major emergencies as well as provide backup 
support to the DoD or VA during times of war.21  The DMAT is but one team in this 
system and is composed of both public and private elements to provide a deployable local 
civilian medical response of the National Disaster Medical System to a national disaster 
event.22  Again, this concept is closely tied to the LEDT concept and review and analysis 
of its management system is necessary before creating a LEDT management system.  In 
an interview with Mr David Lipin, Commander of California DMAT-6, it was further 
learned that state owned DMAT teams across the nation fall under a central federal 
management system that runs through the National Medical Disaster System.23   
 
                                                 
19 Fred Endikrat, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding assessing the 
capabilities and coordination of federal emergency response teams, May 26, 2007, 
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070509150915-39826.pdf (accessed May 6, 2008). 
20 Richard Skinner, Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-
54_Aug06.pdf (accessed May 6, 2008). 
21 United States Department of Homeland Security, “The National Disaster Medical System” (Briefing 
Slides, Washington, D.C., 2005), http://www.ndms.chepinc.org/presentations/2005.shtml (accessed May 6, 
2008). 
22 William L. Devir, “Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, 
Preparedness and Response Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives” 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2007), http://homeland.house.gov/sitedocuments/20070509150859-
15247.pdf (accessed May 6, 2008). 
23 David Lipin, Interview by Author, 2008. 
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Information is fed by state employees who work as part-time federal employees when 
managing the system.  This is a unique concept that could have great applicability to a 
LEDT management system.   
Another team with close structural ties to the LEDT concept is the Illinois Law 
Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) team.  Mr Rick Dinse, Chief Law Enforcement 
Coordinator for FEMA, commented during a visit at NPS on April 23, 2008 that ILEAS 
was a working State system from which the LEDT concept may draw valuable 
information.  Review of this team’s employment and management functions will provide 
a current LE example of how the LEDT management system may be designed to ensure 
proper deployment to national level disasters.  The literature on this concept is produced 
by the State of Illinois and consists of concept and operations documents as well as after 
action reports in budget and management.24 Mr. James Page, the ILEAS Executive 
Director, will be interviewed to fill in any gaps in information in ILEAS documentation.  
Not by design, the proposed LEDT concept is structured closely along the lines of 
the U.S. Air Force Security Forces (USAF/SF) deployment concept.  The resemblance 
lies in two key areas 1) tasking existing resources that have primary jobs with a 
secondary mission to deploy in times of crises and 2) combining disparate small teams 
into a single larger team to conduct contingency operations.25  Study of the USAF/SF 
management system would be appropriate to gather lessons learned in organization, 
equipping, training, and operations before the LEDT management system is fielded.  The 
Air Force Status of Resources and Training program and Status of Forces Reporting 
Systems also provide examples of systems to report the capability of the team training, 
equipment and personnel to a higher authority to maintain a catalogue of force 
availability.26  Interviews with Lt Col Glen Christensen, Deployment Squadron 
commander and Lt Col James Lowe, Air Combat Command Security Forces Deployment 
Manager may be necessary to fill in gaps in written documentation. 
                                                 
24 James Page, Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (Springfield: State of Illinois, 2005), 9. 
25 Thomas Yeager, AF Handbook 31-305, Security Forces Deployment Planning Handbook (San 
Antonio, TX: U.S. Government, 2003), 18. 
26 Dennis C. Blair, Global Status of Resources and Training System (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government, 201), B-1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3401_02.pdf (accessed May 9, 2008). 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
Eugene Bardach’s book, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis and his eight-fold 
path to more effective problem solving will be used to conduct this policy analysis.27  
Bardach provides a succinct and logical approach that provides the flexibility to assess 
this policy without the rigidity to allow the tool to become the master.  The practical 
problem will be framed by a short historical analysis of the law enforcement structure to 
establish why the system is set up in its current configuration.  This study will outline the 
history of the U.S. LE apparatus and present evidence to explain why its central tenets 
make it less than appealing in a wide-area multijurisdictional response and why it is 
unlikely to change even in the face of increasingly more potent manmade and natural 
disasters. 
To begin answering the research question regarding what management system 
should the LEDT concept assume, exploration of alternative deployment teams analogous 
to the LEDT concept is necessary.  Alternatives as previously stated are Urban Search 
and Rescue, Deployable Medical Assistance Teams, the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm 
System deployment concept and Air Force Security Forces.  These reviews will define 
the management systems of the particular teams and tease out smart practices to develop 
a list of alternatives to be evaluated for consideration in design of a LEDT management 
system that will provide the capability to ensure a coordinated deployment in times of 
crises.  Expected evaluative criteria used to assess the alternatives include the ability to 
coordinate, develop shared goals, create management capacity, internal and external 
acceptability and structure of the system to manage and assess the status of resources on a 
daily basis. 
Finally, evaluated alternatives will be used to make policy recommendations for 
the design of the appropriate organizational management system.  Concepts in 
organizational design will be considered in recommending a model for the LEDT that go  
 
                                                 
27 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 149. 
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beyond a hierarchical mechanistic model leading to an organic living network 
construct.28  Potential applicable structures are horizontal organization design,29 team 
based organizations,30 and structured networks.31  
Since the academic literature is thin in portions of the areas to be studied, primary 
sources as indicated in the literature review will be used to fill gaps in information. Other 
sources will consist of the operating documents for the organizations studied. 
                                                 
28 Daniel Robey, Designing Organizations: A Macro Perspective (Homewood, IL: R.D. Irwin, 1982), 
80. 
29 Frank Ostroff, The Horizontal Organization: What the Organization of the Future Looks Like and 
how it Delivers Value to Customers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 25. 
30 Susan Albers Mohrman and Allan M. Mohrman, Designing and Leading Team-Based 
Organizations: A Leader's Facilitator's Guide, 1st ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), 6. 
31 Michael Goold and Andrew Campbell, Designing Effective Organizations, How to Create 
Structured Networks, 1st ed. (Great Britain: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 24. 
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II. UNDERSTANDING BARRIERS TO CHANGING THE U.S. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
New demands on the nation’s LE structure such as international terror groups 
operating within U.S. borders and expanding urban population centers increasingly more 
vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters would appear to be noteworthy factors to 
facilitate a reevaluation and potential restructure of the country’s LE capacity.  However, 
this reevaluation does not appear likely anytime soon.  Why has there been such 
resistance to change in what appears to be a clear-cut problem area?   
Scholars have offered various possible explanations for this lack of change in the 
U.S. LE apparatus outlined in broad categories such as the lack of political will and 
resources,32 unlikely cooperation by local governments to relinquish control of LE 
capability,33 fear of the loss of liberty by citizens34 and concern over potential erosion of 
national democratic principles to name a few.35  
David Bayley, a leading police scholar provides perhaps a deeper insight and 
potential root cause remarking that traditions place a heavy weight on the organization of 
policing.  “In whatever form the police organization begins with and the longer this form 
continues the harder it is to change.”36  It is uncommon that one causal mechanism is 
enough to explain the occurrence of lack of change adequately; however, a brief review 
of history will show that Bayley’s theory is compelling and may be the underwriting 
factor for the other conditional explanations scholars offer. 
                                                 
32 Bruce Smith, Police Systems in the United States, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Harper, 1960), 3. 
33 Eric H. Monkkonen, “History of Urban Police,” Crime and Justice 15, Modern Policing (1992), 
571, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147625 (accessed July 8, 2008). 
34 Hung En Sung, “Structural Determinants of Police Effectiveness in Market Democracies,” Police 
Quarterly 9, no. 3 (2006), 5, http://pqx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/3 (accessed July 12, 2008). 
35 George E. Berkley, “Centralization, Democracy, and the Police,” The Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science 61, no. 2 (June 1970), 309, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1142225 (accessed 
July 12, 2008). 
36 Bayley, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis, 64. 
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The relevance of understanding the historical root cause of the barriers to change 
is necessary to create a modern opportunity so practitioners and decision makers can 
create the opportunity to begin a meaningful evaluation and eventual redesign of U.S. LE.  
In the end, any new system must not only better serve the public but also must be 
politically acceptable and adequately address traditional concerns of better use of 
resources, responsiveness to local needs, and preservation of individual liberty and 
national democratic tenets before it has the slightest chance of being successful.   
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Law enforcement officials first appeared in the American colonies in the form of 
sheriffs and constables from a system descending directly from England.  In old England, 
sheriffs were typically despised, as they were judges, juries and tax collectors all wrapped 
in one.37  Furthermore, the sheriff’s power was derived directly from the king, creating an 
additional source of friction between local citizens and police authority.   
Given fresh example of these negative attributes of early British LE and 
governance, the newly minted American law enforcement system assumed the tenets of 
limited authority strictly established by law, local government control of LE, and a 
decentralized police organization that exists to present times.38  Subsequent formation of 
American LE over time continued to follow the general format of a decentralized 
American governance system of control by the local people largely distrustful of 
centralized authority.   
As American cities grew, the need for increased capability of crime suppression 
and deterrence became apparent.  In furthering the tradition of local control and distrust 
of central authority, the urban police apparatus was born from a system where local 
citizens were appointed as “watchmen” to help curb crime.39  Although mostly 
ineffective and often corrupt, this system ensured the larger police force remained weak, 
fragmented and locally controlled.  As American government become more complex, 
                                                 
37 Smith, Police Systems in the United States, 68. 
38 Hunter, Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police, 206. 
39 Smith, Police Systems in the United States, 104. 
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state and federal police forces formed upon the necessity to enforce laws enacted by these 
growing jurisdictions, in addition to and intermingled with the local jurisdictions.  By 
1905, a patchwork of police agencies in multiple and overlapping jurisdictions was fully 
in place with each police agency’s duties defined by the laws of the jurisdiction they 
resided in and controlled by the political forces to which they were accountable.  The 
result was a “hodgepodge of unconnected, autonomous forces created by various levels 
of government….”40  In light of Bayley’s theory of maintaining tradition, rather than 
create a new and comprehensive system of LE, the old system was gradually added onto 
in a building block manner with the most important goal being to maintain the traditional 
tenets of limited authority, local control and decentralization over and above efficiency 
and effectiveness of the police apparatus.  This resulted in what Bruce Smith termed 
seventy years ago as patches upon patches to provide LE requirements versus the 
development of an interlocking system of policing.41 
C. JURISDICTIONAL DIVIDE AND CONTROL OF POLICE 
These “patches’ occurred because the United States is the only country that does 
not have laws defining the principles of establishing a national policing system.42  
Resultantly, U.S. LE was not constructed as a networked system but rather in piecemeal 
fashion, which led to 17,000 individual, overlapping, sovereign jurisdictions, thus 
complicating the division of responsibility, response priorities, general operations, 
competition for resources and the ability to interoperate effectively in times of larger 
crises.   
American policing started out in a much simpler time when the mission to enforce 
laws and protect the public was restricted to the jurisdictions police forces under which 
they were commissioned.  Simplicity was further aided by little overlap of jurisdictions 
due to physical separation of population centers in frontier society.  The “hodgepodge” of 
                                                 
40 David H. Bayley, “Police Function, Structure and Control in Western Europe and North America; 
Comparative and Historical Studies,” Crime and Justice 1 (1979), 124, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147450 
(accessed July 10, 2008). 
41 Ibid., 124. 
42 Ibid., 109. 
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U.S. LE became increasingly problematic as society progressed from living rurally on 
rangelands and sparsely found frontier towns to modern urban living in villages, 
townships, cities and expansive population centers.  Further complications occurred by 
each local government exercising its sovereignty and legal right to form its own police 
force at will.   
The U.S. LE system was not designed to be purposefully inefficient, but more so 
to be responsive to local values and preferences supported by local revenues.  In light of 
this, Bruce Smith states, there simply was no system of LE in the United States on a 
whole as LE capability was grown in independent islands of population centers that 
eventually grew together.43  This lack of design again follows Bayley’s hypothesis of 
maintaining tradition above all else.   
Not only was a decentralized organization of concern to maintain traditional 
freedom, so too was actual control of the police once formed.44  Early on, the police 
apparatus represented the potential for restraint on freedom and was organized in order to 
limit unnecessary violations of personal liberty.  Restraint of LE was achieved by 
ensuring independent and local civilian control of the police apparatus.  This control 
originally came from legislative committees or administrative boards made up of lay 
people outside of the police organization.45  Although not the most efficient way to 
manage a complex police organization, it achieved the larger desire to ensure the police 
were controlled.  Today, with increasing complexity in modern policing, professional 
police administrators have largely assumed this role ultimately answering to city 
managers or elected mayors who ultimately answer to the public.46  However, scholars 
and practitioners alike have also debated the legitimacy of this practice. 
As recent as the 1960’s, centralization and desires to increase overall efficiency 
and capability in U.S. LE was a hot topic.  Due to the rapid proliferation of small police 
                                                 
43 Smith, Police Systems in the United States, 4. 
44 Ibid., 4. 
45 Ibid., 183. 
46 Bayley, Police Function, Structure and Control in Western Europe and North America; 
Comparative and Historical Studies, 131. 
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forces in the U.S. in the ‘60s, there were high-level attempts to consolidate LE capability.  
The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) 
attempted a consolidation of these smaller forces but to no avail.47  To a minor degree, 
consolidations have been gained via smaller departments folding into larger metropolitan 
county size forces and smaller departments contracting with larger county forces for 
protection.48  These consolidations were largely due to fiscal constraints of the smaller 
jurisdictions.  For the most part, villages, townships and cities and their political leaders 
have not been willing to part with their police forces in exchange for service from a 
centralized external authority. 
Bayley remarked that police of Anglo-Saxon countries are more likely to be 
controlled by local politicians than in other countries.49  This condition has caused many 
to question how true democratic control is achieved given past scandals involving police 
use for local political objectives such as control of immigrant populations and labor 
disputes.50  Again, traditional desire to limit central authority blindly represented by 
police operations has been more compelling than devising modern control measures to 
achieve the effectiveness and efficiency the U.S. complex society now demands of such a 
system.  
D. ANALYSIS 
It should be clear through the brief historical review that American tradition and 
desire to be free from control by a central authority has been a compelling force in how 
U.S. LE formed and exists today.  These traditions are also likely contributing factors in 
restricting discussion of any reevaluation of the system into academic circles only.   
                                                 
47 David H. Bayley, “Comparative Organization of the Police in English-Speaking Countries,” Crime 
and Justice 15, Modern Policing (1992), 534, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147624 (accessed July 10, 
2008). 
48 Albert J. Reiss Jr., “Police Organization in the Twentieth Century,” Crime and Justice 15, Modern 
Policing (1992), 66, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147617 (accessed May 5, 2008). 
49 Bayley, Comparative Organization of the Police in English-Speaking Countries, 531. 
50 Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 581. 
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In the past, the United States had the luxury to operate a decentralized LE system 
in order to maintain these traditions; however, the nature of today’s threats may no longer 
make this a viable option.  As the role of LE expands well beyond simple crime 
prevention and maintenance of public order, increased capability with proper measures of 
efficiency and effectiveness must be considered if the police are to assume the expanding 
role of providing protection of U.S. citizens both pre and post major incident adequately.   
It is not reasonable to believe American traditions can be discounted on the way 
to a new and improved LE capability; nor are they no longer important.  Any 
rearrangement must be politically acceptable for it to work.  However, concerns over 
centralization, control and local ownership of forces and potential loss of liberty should 
be reevaluated.  The ghosts of simple 1780 American society can no longer be allowed to 
blindly dictate limitations on modern LE capability in a complex society.  At a minimum, 
a detailed reevaluation of the U.S. system is warranted.  Such reevaluations have 
occurred in other western nations in recent times resulting in positive changes. 
Europe saw a trend in centralizing forces in Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, France 
and Israel in the ‘60s and ‘70s with England later reducing and consolidating many of its 
forces.51  These moves were made to gain effectiveness of once fragmented LE systems 
and have demonstrated little negative impact on individual liberty as none of these 
countries has become totalitarian police states.52  It is Berkeley’s thesis that small LE 
organizations answerable to local politicians may in fact be less democratically controlled 
then under a central LE structure as police leaders locally are subject to the whims of area 
politicians.53  Many scholars believe the European LE forces are not only more efficient 
overall but also are better controlled to limit violations on the liberties with which 
American society is most concerned.  The European case should serve as an example of 
how changes could be pursued to achieve a new American capability. 
                                                 
51 Berkley, Centralization, Democracy, and the Police, 309. 
52 Ibid., 311. 
53 Ibid., 310. 
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The United States has learned from its mistakes and challenges in other 
emergency response areas within the past forty years.  The organization structure and 
response capability of most of the other first responder components have undergone 
dramatic changes.  The individual response communities realized small town and local 
area response might no longer be enough to answer the needs of the American people 
when facing the major threats posed upon U.S. society.  It is not surprising that 
reformation of U.S. LE is last on the list of things to do in the first responder community.  
This change represents an emotional topic filled with mistrust of the intentions of 
political leaders, fear of loss of control and a general concern over the impacts such a 
change may have on society for all of the reasons discussed in the previous sections.   
Given this situation what can and should be done?  Ronald Hunter says the key to 
any major reform of American LE is gradual implementation.54  Any consolidation of 
local departments into a more robust capable regional force will require a national level 
of effort.  Marks and Sun found through their research that change is not likely to occur 
in LE unless the public demands it and funding is made available to affect the change.55  
Post-hurricane Katrina, there was an outcry by the public and a response by Congress to 
look at law enforcement capability in major disasters, but as everyday passes and the 
memories of Katrina fade, so does the opportunity to affect the necessary change.   
Shortly after Katrina, DHS through the Major Cities Chiefs Association 
accurately assessed the consternation and unlikely major change in U.S. LE and 
embarked on an effort to increase response capability and general LE capability while 
ensuring control of LE is retained by local authorities.  This proposal is the LEDT 
concept; a national LE response to a major crisis situation. 
The remainder of this thesis will address this proposal, look into how the other 
first responder agencies have revised their response capabilities, what management 
systems they use to ensure an effective response and propose a management system to 
ensure the LEDT can do the same. 
                                                 
54 Hunter, Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police, 213. 
55 Marks and Sun, The Impact of 9/11 on Organizational Development among State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 170. 
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III. LAW ENFORCEMENT DEPLOYMENT TEAM CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has endured its share of natural disasters in the past century 
ranging from the all time worst 1900 Galveston hurricane that killed 8,000, the 1906 San 
Francisco earthquake that killed 3,000, the 1927 Flood that displaced 700,000 people 
costing $5B56 as well as thirty six hurricanes prior to Hurricane Katrina that cost lives 
and destroyed property.57  The United States has also endured significant man-made 
disasters such as numerous wildfires deliberately set in California, one of which caused 
28,000 acres to burn and displaced 3,000 residents,58 the LA race riots where police lost 
control of a portion of the city leading to 54 deaths and $800M in damages,59 and the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11 that took 2,974 lives and indirectly cost the nation $27.2B.60  
Despite considerable, previous destruction and loss of life, none of these events called 
into question the structure and ability of U.S. LE like Hurricane Katrina.  Why the 
difference since Katrina did not cause the largest death toll, nor did it impact more area 
than the 1927 flood?   
It is possible to begin to frame the answer to this question by taking three 
interconnected attributes into consideration, 1) the slow and uncoordinated reaction of the 
emergency management system as a whole to deal with Katrina victims, 2) a break down 
of public order after the actual disaster causing event and, 3) the transmission of real-time 
                                                 
56 John M. Barry, “The 1927 Mississippi River Flood and its Impact on U.S. Society and Flood 
Management Strategy,” Center for Bioenvironmental Research, Tulane University, 
http://gsa.confex.com/gsa/2002AM/finalprogram/abstract_44272.htm (accessed July 22, 2008). 
57 Normand Forgues-Roy, “Was Katrina the Biggest, the Worst Natural Disaster in U.S. History?” 
http://hnn.us/articles/17193.html (accessed July 21, 2008). 
58 Mike Anton, “O.C. Fire Chief: 'had we had More Air Resources, we would have been Able to 
Control this Fire' - Los Angeles Times,” LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-
ocfire24oct24,0,5242829.story?coll=la-home-center (accessed July 21, 2008). 
59 Christopher Schnaubelt, Lt Col, “The 1992 Los Angeles Riots: Lessons in Command and Control 
from the Los Angeles Riots,” Parameters, (Summer 1997), 89, 
http://www.militarymuseum.org/LARiots1.html (accessed July 30, 2008). 
60 Robert Looney, “CCC - the Economic Costs of 9/11,” Naval Postgraduate School, 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.asp (accessed July 21, 2008). 
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tragedy onto the television screens of an entire nation.  The temporal context of Katrina 
also further propelled the demand to reevaluate the capability of U.S. LE.  Specifically, 
the Katrina response demonstrated a failure in the regional and national emergency 
management system that followed closely on the tail end of the 9/11 attacks prompting 
the public and members of Congress to question the ability of LE to respond to other 
large-scale events in the future.  Before discussing DHS’ response to this issue, a brief 
summary of how LE is currently deployed is necessary to establish an understanding of 
current procedures, perhaps leading to a better understanding of the current situation. 
B. HOW ADDITIONAL LE ASSISTANCE IS DEPLOYED TODAY 
Law Enforcement and other first responder capabilities are deployed into 
requesting jurisdictions via a tiered approach. All emergencies are initially presumed to 
be local events, although in the case of massive disasters like Katrina, this presumption 
may be short-lived or even pro forma.  Nevertheless, response always starts locally with 
the city, and when the city is unable to handle the problem within organic resources, they 
look to outside assistance starting with requests to local private sector businesses and 
organizations.  As these resources are exhausted, cities ask counties for support and if the 
support is not available or is exhausted, counties ask other counties or parishes, counties 
ask states and states ask other states.  When assistance goes beyond the state’s ability to 
help each other, the federal government receives the request for assistance.  This system 
provides a tiered response that allows local governments to handle their own problems 
without interference from above yet provides a mechanism to obtain the right additional 
help when necessary.   
Given today’s myriad of potential threats and hazards, each jurisdiction must be 
prepared to deploy as a first line responder within their own jurisdiction and as a 
requested backup in other jurisdictions.  To facilitate rapid response, jurisdictions have 
entered into memorandums of understanding and agreement with each other to define 
accurately what services can be provided in order to limit negotiations for support during 
the crises itself.  Perhaps the premier compact between jurisdictions is the Emergency  
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Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system between states.  The current EMAC 
system is comprised of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Puerto 
Rico and Guam and was ratified by Congress in 1996 as Public Law 104-321.61   
The EMAC system is used by states during governor declared emergencies to 
request assistance from other states.  The compact system is administered by the National 
Emergency Management Association, a 501c(3) non-profit organization, not directly 
linked with the federal government thus making it a state ran system.62  EMAC allows 
states to access resources from other states by either going directly to a state with an 
EMAC request or by putting out a broadcast for assistance to all states via the EMAC 
operations system.63  This broadcast allows states to view requests for assistance by other 
states and answer with a proposal to provide assistance.  One of the most attractive 
features of this system is it uses a pre-agreed acceptance compact by all states regarding 
each other’s licensing and credentialing regimens, it acts as a promise to reimburse the 
responding state for all expenses and provides indemnity from liability for responders 
acting in good faith.  States requesting assistance can review proposals from potential 
responding states, and once they accept assistance from a responding state, this 
acceptance acts as a legally binding contractual agreement.64  Perhaps one of the most 
strenuous LE examples of EMAC in action was deployment during Hurricane Katrina of 
6,880 sheriffs’ deputies and police officers from thirty-five states and numerous 
jurisdictions.65   
The EMAC system covers states helping states.  Should capability become 
exhausted or if states require a unique federal capability in an emergency declared by a 
state governor, the federal government engages by employing the National Response 
                                                 
61 Angela Copple, Introduction to EMAC (Rosslyn, VA: National Emergency Management 
Association, 2008), 3. 
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65 Ibid., 8. 
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Framework using the principles of the National Incident Management System to provide 
the requisite federal response.  Within this framework are various levels of command 
nationally, regionally and embedded at state and local levels, to facilitate the application 
of federal resources.  These federal resources are divided into fifteen emergency support 
functions (ESF)s managed by FEMA and deployed by the National Response 
Coordination Center, FEMA’s 24/7 operations center.66  The ESFs range across first 
responder and support functions such as transportation, communications, fire fighting, 
public safety and security etc. and are a bundling of federal resources and capabilities 
spread across government agencies, NGOs and the private sector but managed by a single 
point functional area expert within the federal government.67  Resources are typed into 
specific capabilities as packages to standardize deployed support.   
In emergency and disaster situations, ESF 13, Public Safety and Security 
resources may be employed as local and EMAC resources are exhausted.  Main ESF 13 
missions are technical assistance, public safety and security assessments, badging and 
credentialing, access control, site security, traffic and crowd control, force protection, 
security for the strategic national stockpile, security surveillance and provision of 
specialized security resources.68  During Hurricane Katrina, ESF 13 deployed over 3,500 
federal agents from across the federal government with many aiding the New Orleans 
Police Department in basic LE functions.69   
Given what appears to be a robust capability to move forces under the EMAC and 
ESF 13 systems, why the outcry for review of U.S. LE and the follow-on DHS LEDT 
concept?  In the Katrina example, although the EMAC system delivered a considerable 
amount of LE assistance into the impacted area, specific concerns arose over who 
deployed, how they deployed, what capability they deployed with as well as speed of the 
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67 Ibid., 57. 
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deployment.70  These issues surfaced as various responders self deployed into the impact 
area unannounced.  Some were not equipped to handle the environmental conditions after 
arriving while other responding units had problems synchronizing their efforts with LE 
units already on the ground.  Bluntly, delivering warm bodies is not the same as 
delivering a proficient and synchronized capability ready to assist.  All of these factors 
lessened the effectiveness of the LE response.  
One of the greatest criticisms of ESF 13 in the Katrina case was the LE response 
was slower than other first responder agencies like US&R and DMAT.  Given the 
perceived lawless condition of New Orleans, many of these rescue-oriented first 
responder units could not or would not deploy into the city without a LE escort.71  This 
condition negatively impacted the speed of the overall recovery of New Orleans.  
Approximately four days after landfall, 1600 federal LE officers were in New Orleans; 
however, the city was not declared under LE control until fourteen days after the initial 
landfall.72  Although ESF 13 clearly was successful in the physical movement of federal 
officers to this disaster area, it lacked in speed and coordination of forces potentially 
allowing the aftermath of the disaster to be worse than it should have been.73  These 
criticisms directly tie to and perhaps provide partial explanation of why it took fourteen 
days to assert LE control over the city.  Some may argue that grading LE assistance 
against a Hurricane Katrina level incident may be unrealistic or unfair.  However, not 
knowing what the future holds makes solving these issues now an investment in our 
ability to better serve the public need in the future. 
Solving these overarching concerns is a function of the LE community as a whole 
where simple indictment of the EMAC and ESF 13 systems as deployment mechanisms 
cannot provide complete answers.  The speed of each system in support of a major 
regional disaster is an area for improvement that could be positively impacted by the LE 
community developing a new mechanism of pre-packaging deployable capability that is 
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already sourced to deploy and is properly synchronized into the response scheme.  Such a 
concept would provide a new and robust LE capability without significantly altering the 
structure of LE throughout the country.   
The existence of pre-planned and exercised teams against likely scenarios would 
provide the jump start to place forces on the ground without the current administrative 
delays, much like the U.S. military does with force packaging and war plans.  This 
capability could assist to better position the LE community to answer the three initial 
attributes raised at the beginning of this chapter that seemingly made Katrina a watershed 
event.  First, by providing a timely response of trained and synchronized forces 
knowledgeable of the area thus alleviating the second concern by properly occupying and 
managing the incident area after the disaster event to prevent additional destruction from 
social disorder while indirectly reducing the third concern of the media effect on the rest 
of the country.  
In this vein, DHS recently responded to the Congressional concerns with a 
meeting of the Major Cities Chief’s Association, select members of the Major County 
Sheriff’s Association, the National Emergency Management Association, FBI, Bureau of 
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms and various sub offices of DHS and FEMA to discuss the 
way ahead.  This body readily identified that lack of a national police agency or national 
police force to protect the public and maintain the rule of law during disasters may be a 
historical luxury that can no longer be maintained.74  However, the result of their efforts 
did not include a recommendation to revamp the LE structure of the country, but 
proposed an intermediate step to build capability thus staying out of the debate regarding 
the efficacy of a new national LE structure.  The development team proposed a concept 
termed the Law Enforcement Deployment Team.   
C. LEDT CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
To date, the LEDT is merely a concept agreed upon in theory by the previously 
mentioned major organizations, but not yet operationalized.  The overarching tenets 
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cover most of the traditional who, what, when, where, why and how of planning; 
however, there are key loose ends in the “how” category that require resolution prior to 
the concept evolving into a fielded force.  These “loose ends” will be further identified 
and discussed in more detail in the management considerations and gaps section of this 
chapter. 
Who/What/Why:  The LEDT concept is designed to package local and state LE 
officers of multiple jurisdictions and on a volunteer basis into a single highly trained and 
likely equipped deployable team.  This new team presents a homogenous capability that 
has not been achieved under past EMAC deployments of parts and pieces LE assistance.  
The former configuration of deployed LE is not a fault of the EMAC system, but is due to 
the previous shortsightedness of the LE community as a whole to develop a deployment 
capability found in the medical and US&R communities for the past eighteen years.  The 
LEDT concept is an attempt to correct this flaw of disparate manpower with a team 
approach.  The preponderance of forces will likely come from larger departments as they 
have more capacity to supply manpower, absorb larger absences and are more apt to have 
advanced training and experience.75  Federal law enforcement officers were excluded as 
potential team members as they fall under the ESF 13 deployment mechanism.   
When:  LEDT assets may be deployed when states or local areas do not have 
enough LE capability to answer the demand within existing resources or when states 
cannot adequately answer the demand for LE assets through local memorandums of 
understanding, agreement or other intrastate compacts.  By the concept, the trigger 
mechanism for deployment is designed to occur via a request by the state governor 
through the state emergency manager who will use the EMAC system to find states that 
have available resources.76  This would launch the deployment of an appropriately sized 
and resourced LEDT to the affected area.   
Where:  The concept also states the LEDT will be organized along the lines of 
the ten existing FEMA regions and FEMA logistics centers (see Figure 1) as Urban 
                                                 
75 Major Cities Chiefs Association, Law Enforcement Deployment Teams, 7. 
76 Ibid., 3. 
 28
Search and Rescue teams currently are.  Manpower for single teams will be capped at 
five hundred personnel to preclude negatively impacting the ability to deploy rapidly.  
Teams will also be of a modular design so they may be deployed as an entire team or as 
modules of whole teams according to the local on-scene commander’s requirements.  
Teams should be deployed for no longer than fourteen days and will have standardized 
credentials and uniforms with members selected to meet well defined minimum training, 
experience, equipment and performance standards.77   
 
 
Figure 1. The ten existing FEMA regions and FEMA logistics centers78 
D. OPERATIONAL TENETS 
LEDTs will provide core LE service in seven areas such as patrol, crowd control, 
custody teams etc.  They will also provide advanced and specialized skills in fourteen 
mission areas such as SWAT, bomb disposal, hostage negotiation, etc.  Logistically, they 
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will arrive with all requisite equipment to operate independently for fourteen days and 
will report to and work for the local incident commander consistent with current national 
incident management and incident command system doctrine.79  Prior to the deployment 
of an LEDT, the local incident commander will assess the situation and call for the 
necessary LEDT support through the state emergency manager and governor.  A regional 
LEDT advance team will also be deployed to the affected area to help the incident 
commander determine the right mix of LEDT resources or follow-on forces to be 
deployed.80   
In the past, when disaster and emergency situations drove the need for additional 
LE capability, the National Guard, under control of the governor, has been the force of 
choice to provide this capability quickly.  The reason is the National Guard is a vast 
resource within the state, directly owned and controlled by the governor or responding 
state’s governor and is readily accessible.  During Hurricane Katrina, 50,000 National 
Guard troops were deployed in State and Title 32 status leaving them under the direct 
control of the governors.81  During the LA race riots, 10,000 California National Guard 
forces were deployed to support the LAPD in riot control operations and other direct LE 
missions.82   
The LEDT concept does not replace the National Guard.  An interview with 
Charles Eaneff, DHS and review of the LEDT concept paper both indicate the National 
Guard is a compatible force with the LEDT concept.83  However, under the concept, the 
Guard’s role would be adjusted more towards civil support and resource protection type 
missions, leaving the LEDT to conduct LE functions that involve more interfaces with 
the public as well as missions that require a higher degree of specialized LE training.84  
This takes the infantry, engineer or transportation trained National Guard troop out of the 
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role of performing advanced law enforcement functions in dynamic and intense civil 
situations.  The National Guard’s assistance in other support areas such as 
communications, construction of facilities like holding cells, point defense of critical 
infrastructure and the like would allow the deployed law enforcement officer to be used 
more efficiently in direct law enforcement and maintenance of public order capacities. 
It is envisioned the LEDT will function in two large mission areas.  First, in 
responses to natural disasters, manmade and terrorist incidents as requested by state and 
local area officials, and secondly, in prevention roles such as securing high threat 
situations or national special security events, e.g., the Republican/Democratic National 
Conventions, Olympics, Super Bowl, etc. as declared by the Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security.85  To date there has not been any analysis regarding how often the 
LEDT would have been used in the past had it been available.  Such analysis would be 
helpful to conduct a cost benefit analysis to aid in scaling the teams appropriately.  
Further research is required in this area; however, it will not be further addressed in this 
thesis project, as it is not part of the original research question. 
Once the team is initially formed, it is expected they will play a large role in 
prevention operations around the country.86  These operations may partially alleviate the 
question of how the LEDT may have been used in the past by employing it in a new and 
evolving prevention and protection mission area.  These deployments have many benefits 
such as allowing team members to become accustomed to working with each other prior 
to deployment to more complex or austere environments.  These operations would also 
exercise the management mechanism and allow teams to work out logistic and 
deployment bugs prior to moving LEDTs in crises operations.  
E. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND GAPS 
Operationally, there is little doubt the LEDT concept if adopted could greatly 
increase the projection of a highly trained, equipped and skilled LE capability into areas 
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of need.  The LEDT concept effectively describes who comprises the team, what the team 
will be used for, when it is likely to be deployed, what its expected capabilities will be 
and why the team is necessary.  However, from a management perspective, the concept 
becomes unclear and unbalanced when outlining the tenets of who, where and how the 
team is managed prior to its deployment.  This imbalance skirts the age-old debate of 
local control of LE and centralized versus decentralized capability that yet again 
unnecessarily complicates the delivery of effective LE capability in times of need.  
Creation of the LEDT itself provides only a partial operational solution to the current 
problems previously discussed; however, without a well-defined management system 
with clear roles and responsibilities, the tenets of the original debate within LE allow the 
problems clearly identified during Katrina to linger.   
The first case of conflict occurs where the plan describes prior to deployment, 
“the DHS Office of State and Local Law Enforcement would be responsible for policy, 
planning and management of LEDTs in close coordination with FEMA.”87  Furthermore, 
during the deployment, FEMA is slated to take an operational role of coordination to 
ensure LEDTs operate in concert with other federal teams.  This is certainly a federal-
centric approach to LEDT management and employment given these are state resources 
traditionally owned by governors, county leaders and mayors and employed by state 
emergency managers.  The question becomes, how do DHS and/or FEMA intend to 
administratively direct, track and manage these state and local resources prior to the 
declaration of an emergency?  Ownership and execution of these management functions 
are potential points of contention that must be resolved by developing a coherent 
management plan.  
To further this point, the federal government does not get involved in wide-scale 
local emergency responses that would involve the use of a LEDT type resource until the 
governor asks the president to declare an affected area as a national disaster or emergency 
area.88  Upon this declaration, federal support is provided with federal assets via ESFs, 
not by the federal government moving and using state owned assets.  States already carry 
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out this function on their own as seen via EMAC.  Additionally, EMAC owned, state 
sponsored National Coordinating and Regional Coordinating Teams aid to synchronize 
state resources in federal response scenarios in coordination with FEMA, but not by 
FEMA as alluded to in the LEDT concept.89  The LEDT concept defines a condition 
where LEDTs are managed by DHS but moved by EMAC creating a confusing or at the 
least unusual command relationship between the federal, state and local governments and 
the LEDT.  The command relationship must be solidly defined in a management plan. 
Drilling further down into the same area, the concept states the EMAC system 
will be used to deploy the team, which implies the states are in control.  State emergency 
managers manage state resources via databases that are not typically shared with other 
states or the federal government.90  Effective EMAC deployment of these forces would 
require states to manage the information and systems centrally to move teams, which 
again runs counter to the plan for the DHS Office of State and Local Law Enforcement to 
plan and manage teams centrally.  Questions of precedence are bound to arise; one entity 
moves the teams and is the rightful owner of the resource and another entity is 
responsible for policy, central planning and management.  Clearly, the command 
relationship must be identified in these areas and be properly coupled with the 
deployment management and delivery mechanism before the LEDT has any hope of 
operating effectively or efficiently.   
Equally important as determining the proper command relationship is determining 
what management information system will be used to manage the force, where it will 
reside, who will operate it and what agencies will have access to the data.  Supplying LE 
relief forces to troubled areas, not unlike a military deployment, will only work properly 
if the elements of that force are pre-identified by location and capability to include:  
manpower, equipment and training status; transportation and logistics requirements and 
availability to deploy.  These factors must then be applied in the planning phase to create 
force packages against expected scenarios.  These force packages will aid the deployment 
entity to deliver packaged forces in times of emergency and resolves who is deployed, 
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how they are deployed and provide the necessary speed to the fight, all previously 
identified detractors during the Hurricane Katrina response.  Who actually conducts these 
management activities and how they are codified are also not explained in the LEDT 
concept and are weak spots that detract from this otherwise robust concept.91  
Proper management of the LEDT concept should take the principles of war, unity 
of command and simplicity into account.  In the current iteration of the concept, both 
elements are likely to be violated if one level of government executes management and 
reporting responsibilities while another executes deployment responsibilities.  
Fortunately, there are standing examples of teams at federal and state levels that have 
working management systems to deliver the right capability at the right place and time.  
Discussion and analysis of other similar first responder teams such as the DMAT, US&R, 
ILEAS and USAF/SF will be conducted to ferret out existing smart practices that can be 
used as a template to suggest options to build an effective LEDT management 
mechanism.   
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IV. REVIEW OF OTHER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS AND 
THEIR MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When creating a new organization or capability, it often appears easier to use 
what is already present as a model rather than starting from a blank slate.  With this 
approach in mind, developers of the LEDT concept have specifically honed in on two 
existing federal response teams stating the proposed national LEDT plan should “build on 
the success of similar programs such as US&R and DMAT.”92  The plan goes on to make 
numerous references to these two teams as good templates and uses many of their tenets 
to develop the pillars of the LEDT concept.  No doubt, the DMAT and US&R teams 
themselves have valiantly delivered crucial services to the community over the years as 
noted by Congress and emergency response practitioners alike.93  This critical acclaim is 
perhaps what makes the teams attractive as a starting point for reform; however, their 
management systems have not received the same glowing remarks.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the mere existence of teams does not make for a national response 
system.   
With this point in mind, the salient questions become, is there a historic record of 
successful performance in these two team’s management systems that would indicate 
they may be appropriate systems to template from, or do these teams succeed despite 
their management mechanisms?  Additionally, US&R and DMAT teams are only two of 
several hundred response teams that reside within the federal government.  Although 
there is not enough time in this project to study them all, review of the management 
systems of other yet similar response teams is prudent to determine potential applicability 
and to identify other possible smart practices.  Therefore, in addition to review of the 
DMAT and US&R management systems, a review of a state emergency response team in  
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the form of the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) and a military system 
in the form of the U.S. Air Force Security Forces will also be conducted to gain a broader 
perspective of other potential management system options.   
The rationale for review of these systems is to provide key insights to help answer 
the original research question of what management structure should be applied to the 
newly proposed LEDT concept to assist it better to fill the void of depleted law 
enforcement services effectively in disaster scenarios.  The following sections will 
address background, deployment concepts and deployment history of the teams reviewed 
to demonstrate their likeness to the LEDT concept followed by a description of the 
management system, how they responded to crises and ending with a discussion of smart 
practices. 
B. THE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM (NDMS) AND 
DISASTER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS (DMAT) 
1. Mission 
The National Disaster Medical System is an overarching and integrated national 
medical response program formed in 1984 to provide support to local and state 
authorities during disasters and to provide support to DoD for hospitalization of troops 
returning from foreign battles.94  This system is two pronged. First, it uses a commercial 
and government supported transport system to move civilian patients from domestic 
disasters and/or military patients returning from war to a network of participating 
hospitals.  On a second front, NDMS is comprised of five categories of response teams 
for a total of 107 teams that can be dispatched to support the medical needs of local  
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communities during disasters or in support of national events.95  The remainder of the 
discussion regarding NDMS will proceed within this second front:  domestic response 
and the associated management system used to make it work. 
Within NDMS, medical response teams termed DMATs were created from local 
volunteer civilian medical personnel who are packaged into teams and deployed to a 
disaster or to an event where additional medical support is required.  The concept of 
deploying state and local medical personnel to regional crises is nearly identical to what 
the LEDT proposal hopes to achieve within the law enforcement community.   
NDMS itself is the management organization and mechanism that supports 
DMATs through the development of policy, standards, regulations and execution of 
deployments and logistical support.  NDMS and its response teams were originally 
formed under the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) providing a 
consolidated healthcare delivery system; however, after the 9/11 attacks, this system and 
its teams were moved under DHS and FEMA to achieve a one stop shopping approach to 
emergency response.96  After the poor federal response to areas stricken by Hurricane 
Katrina, NDMS and its deployment teams were moved back under DHHS in 2007.  This 
move was to centralize medical care delivery to help correct the spotty management and 
deployment performance under DHS.97 
2. Team Deployment Concept 
The DMAT is comprised of local, volunteer civilian doctors, nurses, and para-
professionals who have agreed to form a medical response team from mostly private 
sector resources and personnel.  DMAT members work daily as medical professionals 
residing in various healthcare organizations within their communities.  Day-to-day, the  
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DMAT is supported by a sponsor agency such as a medical center, hospital, health 
department or private organization.98  The sponsor agency aids by keeping track of 
licensure issues and provides limited management and administrative support.  
If a local or state-level emergency occurs, these members form the DMAT and 
can be deployed into the local community or other areas of the state by the state 
emergency manager.  They may also be deployed under EMAC in a state-to-state 
response.  When teams are deployed for a national mission by NDMS under Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) 8, they become federal employees.99  Given the number of 
potential tasking agencies of DMAT manpower, it is imperative a solid tracking system is 
in place to monitor the status of teams so an accurate picture of the national medical 
response capability is fully understood should it be needed. 
Teams are typically deployable within six to 12 hours, consist of 35 members and 
deploy for 14-day durations, but can be extended as the situation dictates.100  Team 
readiness is defined as level I through IV depending on the number of available 
deployable members, how fast they can deploy and the status of the team’s equipment.101  
Teams and their equipment can be deployed via air or have organic ground transport 
assets to get them to the disaster location without additional outside support if necessary.  
Equipment is obtained through donation by sponsor agencies, provided by states and 
purchased with grant money from the federal government.  Deployed team members 
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and their medical license is universally recognized in the state to which they are 
deployed.102  With the exception of federalizing forces, the DMAT deployment concept 
is nearly identical to what the LEDT concept proposes for LE deployments.  
Without getting into a detailed discussion of the intricacies of each step of 
response and deployment defined in the National Incident Management System and the 
National Response Framework, a brief outline of the federal response as it relates to 
medical deployment is as follows.  When a state requires additional help during an 
incident, the governor requests federal assistance via the provisions of the Stafford Act.  
The federal support system engages by activating the appropriate ESF(s) to deploy the 
necessary support.  In the case of an emergency requiring medical support, ESF 8 is 
activated and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is responsible for 
deployment of medical assets to the requesting states through its emergency management 
group housed in the DHHS secretary’s operation center.103  With regard to DMATs, the 
emergency management group activates NDMS to push field-level medical response to 
the states.  Teams are contacted, given deployment orders, instructions and are dispatched 
to the event as federal assets.  The DMAT deployment model is interesting from a 
resource perspective, as team personnel and a portion of their equipment are local 
resources; however, when called upon by NDMS, they are federalized under the national 
response system.   
3. Deployment History 
DMAT deployments began in 1989 with support to Hurricane Hugo victims and 
continued over the years with responses to other natural disasters such as floods, 
earthquakes, ice storms; and to man-made disasters like air crashes and terror events.  




                                                 
102 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT). 
103 Chertoff, The National Response Framework, 8-3. 
 40
Republican and Democratic National Conventions, inaugurations, the Olympics, state of 
the union addresses and state visits by foreign dignitaries; all missions envisioned for the 
LEDT.104   
Although the teams themselves performed well during these deployments, DMAT 
team members had periodically expressed concern over management support and the 
logistics infrastructure of the medical response management system.105  Deployment to 
Hurricane Katrina brought these concerns to the forefront when teams were deployed to 
the wrong place or could not get to areas that were in critical need of their services due to 
mismanagement.106  Of equal concern, federal management support teams (MST) 
deployed to help DMATs integrate into the local structure and charged with working 
logistics and management issues in the field, were either inexperienced or untrained 
causing many of the problems they were sent to resolve.107  Poor FEMA-level 
management also caused serious problems where teams either did not have or could not 
get the requisite medical supplies and equipment to treat the public.108  These events 
caused a flurry of Congressional hearings and reviews by DHS, FEMA, DHHS and 
DMAT team commanders alike to determine what was required to correct the 
management system.  The result was a decision to return the management system from 
DHS back to DHHS with a review and reconfiguration of NDMS that continues today.  
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4. Management System 
A local volunteer team member who is paid by the federal government to conduct 
DMAT management activities conducts daily management of the DMAT.109  This is not 
a full-time position and many DMAT activities such as training and equipment 
management are done without compensation.110  Management actions and reporting of 
DMAT status is done locally and is transmitted to a federal coordinating function within 
NDMS.   
NDMS management has had its share of problems.  As early as 2002, when 
NDMS was under DHHS the first time, officials were warned that the system had major 
problems to include poor management practices, inadequate funding and lack of relevant 
doctrine and standards.111  In the CNA Corporation’s report, Assessing NDMS Response 
Team Readiness: Focusing on DMATs, NMRTs and the MST, October 2002, it noted of 
70 DMATs, only 16 could meet requirements to deploy a full team to a disaster.  The 
report also noted that teams were not deployed based upon readiness, but by how “well 
connected” they were in the system.  Finally, NDMS lacked data and tracking systems to 
evaluate its own readiness.  NDMS as a management system was clearly in decline in 
2002; however, reports by team commanders show it may have been headed that way for 
some time. 
When NDMS transferred to DHS in 2003, the medical response management 
system became even less functional.  First, the $34M budget allotted to NDMS was 
stripped of $20M by DHS to pay for bio-defense projects,112 and the system was 
organizationally buried four layers deep within FEMA where NDMS proponents could  
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not get the attention of management to raise issues.113  NDMS management personnel 
were cut from 144 to 57 personnel, which contributed to the management and operational 
deployment deficiencies evidenced in the Katrina report.114   
The first operational indicator that NDMS was crippled under DHS was during 
the 2004 hurricane deployment season where individual DMATs incurred problems in 
planning, logistical support, supply and communications.115  Despite these indicators, 
few efforts were made to shore up NDMS.  In 2005, during the Katrina response, there 
were reports of serious support breakdowns where team leaders used personal credit 
cards or took up collections from team members to buy medical supplies, secure truck 
transport and book motel rooms for team members.116  Unified response capability 
hinges on a coherent management system to operate a complex network that has a 
common operating picture of the problem and available resources, coupled with the span 
of control and authority to mobilize those resources to action.  NDMS, as a management 
system, was clearly failing in that regard.  Teams were making things happen in the field 
despite the management system that was supposed to support them.  In one case, a 
prominent surgeon and member of the Massachusetts DMAT, resigned upon return from 
a NDMS deployment because management by NDMS failed critically in supporting his 
team in the field.117  It was also stated by this surgeon and others that there was a lack of 
a concept of operations, teams were deployed to staging areas and forgotten, were 
deployed without the infrastructure to conduct patient care, and the system lacked 
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standardized information processing protocols.118  By 2005, it appears DMATs were 
working by the graces of good Samaritans in spite of the NDMS management system.   
Based on the previous facts, it would appear the NDMS management system is 
ineffective and not a good candidate to consider for development of the LEDT 
management system.  However, before condemning it completely, consideration should 
be given to the possibility that it was merely under-resourced rather than poorly 
structured.  A central umbrella organization, if properly staffed and resourced, could 
capitalize on the principles of unity of command and effort, economy of force and 
simplicity, which are often hard to achieve in multi-layered organizations, particularly in 
emergency response scenarios where operations occur under chaotic conditions.119  If 
properly supported, such a system could employ these principles to achieve efficiencies 
via centralized management to facilitate a decentralized yet synchronized application of 
effort as will be shown in the state and military systems reviewed later in this chapter.   
There are several features of the NDMS and DMAT management configurations 
that detract from its effectiveness and should act as warnings to the LEDT concept 
designers when forming the national LEDT management system.  The first area of 
concern is the use of volunteer managers at the team level.  Since full-time personnel do 
not fill these positions, continuity of effort may be sacrificed causing the team to be less 
prepared than the response system believes they are.  Part-time efforts by multiple 
volunteer members conducting daily tracking, training of personnel and management of 
team equipment and logistics could cause problems in readiness as well.  This point was 
made by Dr. Jeffrey Lowell in a report to the Secretary of Homeland Security in January 
of 2005 and has also been reported by DMAT team leaders.120  Second, in order to 
execute a “national” response system, there must be an agency vested with the authority, 
resources and information to manage this capability effectively.  In the case of NDMS, 
funding and manpower issues at the national management level did not keep pace with 
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the increasing demands of frequency and complexity of medical team deployments.  The 
resulting shortfalls in policy, doctrine and logistics support at the national level cascaded 
to the team level as manifested by evictions from warehouses due to a lack of ability to 
pay the rent, absence of team protocols for operations and fragmented response 
capability.121  Finally, with potential tasking agencies from three different levels of 
government, none of whom owns the teams but all of whom impose obligations, there is 
a potential for loss of a common operating picture.  In the end, without central 
management, all that remained was a loose network of teams operating on the residuals 
of previous training, funding and experienced personnel.   
5. Smart Practices 
Despite the overwhelming problems with NDMS as a management system, there 
are attributes that could be useful in the formation of the LEDT management system if 
properly supported. 
The LEDT concept does not propose a single NDMS-type umbrella organization 
to manage its day-to-day requirements, develop and execute policy matters and conduct 
emergency deployments.  This lack of a working central management entity is what 
doomed DMATs to substandard performance as disparate teams were forced to take 
matters into their own hands.  Although NDMS did not present a positive example, some 
kind of centralized organization should be considered.  Florence Heffron identifies these 
highly efficient “machine bureaucracies” as currently existing in the typical LE 
organization, and therefore, it should not be a foreign concept.122   
The current LEDT concept envisions the DHS Office of State and Local Law 
Enforcement will act in the policy and management capacity but has not fully defined 
these responsibilities.  The EMAC system is envisioned as the mechanism to move the 
teams in national emergency situations or in support to national events.  To date, neither 
EMAC nor its management authority, the National Emergency Management Association, 
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have systems to manage LEDT resources effectively.123  EMAC relies on individual state 
emergency managers to track and catalogue capabilities and then takes the data fed to 
them in the form of a request for support and facilitates the transaction between the states. 
This is the exact situation documented to have slowed LE, DMAT and other support to 
Katrina.  Fragmenting the management and deployment functions between two different 
major organizations may not be the most efficient way to employ LEDT resources. 
As the LEDT concept is designed, there are five layers and two sub-layers of 
management between LEDT daily operations and deployment to a disaster site:  the local 
team leader, sponsor agency, DHS/FEMA, EMAC/NEMA and state emergency 
managers.  This management chain could be cut down considerably by employing a one-
stop NDMS-like management organization that writes policy, legislates standards, 
develops procedures, conducts daily status reporting, conducts budgeting and funding and 
executes deployments.  Consolidation of these functions could reduce duplication of 
effort at various management levels and would provide a single voice to help reduce 
communication and execution issues through a unity of direction.124  As the LEDT 
concept is currently designed, the traditional decentralized approach to law enforcement 
is fully embedded in its management design and could continue to hinder LE 
employment in emergency situations.   
As discussed in Chapter I, there are those both in and outside the LE community 
that are fearful of centralization.  However, a central umbrella management system does 
not equate to a national police force.  Decentralization is maintained because resources 
are owned and controlled by local and state governments who retain the ability to use 
these resources, as they deem necessary.  The management system merely provides the 
missing comprehensive oversight required to understand the current status of forces, 
equipment, training and so forth.   
                                                 
123 Copple, Interview by Author. 
124 Vincent Marino, “14 Principles of Management (Henri Fayol),” 
http://www.12manage.com/methods_fayol_14_principles_of_management.html (accessed September 3, 
2008). 
 46
If the LEDT concept is proposed to serve as a “national” law enforcement 
deployment program, it should be resourced and supported by a single national 
mechanism.  When activated for a national mission, members should become federal 
employees who are paid and indemnified by the federal government.  The requisite 
equipment, training, supplies and logistical tail should be largely covered under this 
program.  This arrangement would put the LEDT on par with DMAT and US&R teams 
where the federal government can achieve a national response capability by compelling 
state-level teams to meet specific training, reporting and standardization in equipment 
and tactics in return for federal funding and technical support.  With this arrangement, 
states obtain advanced LE capability and the federal government grows a national LE 
response system exactly as the other major first responder communities have.   
As the LEDT concept is currently written, it is likely to fall short of becoming a 
national response system.  Forming LEDTs with state resources augmented by sporadic 
federal grants while moving teams for national missions under the auspices of EMAC 
and its protocols for reimbursement and indemnification puts the brunt of action on the 
states and their management structures.  The LEDT concept merely expands on what the 
planners hope teams will look like.  It does not provide proper incentive to develop a 
unified team, a management system or for states to participate for that matter.  Without 
the full benefits of federal resources and funding, the LE response system may be more of 
an array of pickup teams versus a national response system.   
The LEDT concept is wrestling with a theory to stage and deliver equipment, 
leaning towards regional prepositioning.125  DMAT experience shows LEDT equipment 
should be collocated with LEDTs as opposed to being regionally staged.  DMATs with 
local control of their equipment have the ability to inventory, train with, and maintain 
their own gear, and know what they are deploying with and how to use it upon arrival.  
However, teams that had their supply and equipment delivered from regional areas 
encountered problems matching team and equipment arrival times and not all members 
were familiar with the equipment upon delivery leaving some teams ineffective at the 
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site.126  Collocated equipment drives other logistical concerns such as the need to have 
trucks to move it.  Trucks, in turn, provide the team the organic capability to respond 
without outside help and reduce the need to compete for airlift.  Ground response times 
could be managed by deploying internal region teams and teams from adjacent regions 
first and airlifting others from the outer regions if more manpower is required.  Finally, 
teams not in physical possession of their equipment are less valuable as responders to 
intrastate and local incidents because they are no longer properly outfitted to deploy as a 
specialized team.   
Overall, the central management system necessary to execute a unified DMAT 
response fragmented and failed due to the lack of resources.  This does not mean a 
centralized structure is inappropriate.  More so, LEDT planners should be wary of 
fragmenting the LEDT management system in the design phase.  
C. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE (US&R) 
1. Mission 
The National Urban Search and Rescue Response System was established in 1990 
after the Loma Prieta, California earthquake to provide states with the capability to rescue 
victims of structural collapse effectively.127  Team members possess skills in the fields of 
engineering, emergency medicine, canine-handling, firefighting, law enforcement, 
hazardous material handling, communications and logistics.128  The team’s purpose is to 
deploy to a disaster area rapidly as a self-contained element to begin urban search and  
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rescue operations in support of the local government’s needs.  The US&R team concept 
is another federal deployment of state and local resources, and is very similar to the 
capability envisioned for the LEDT. 
In 1992 under the Federal Response Plan, urban search and rescue led by FEMA 
was the only search and rescue mission area contained within the ESF 9 Urban Search 
and Rescue Annex.129  After Katrina, ESF 9 was redefined in a broader context to 
centralize all sub-elements of the search and rescue community into one plan.  With this 
change, ESF 9 included waterborne search and rescue, with the U.S. Coast Guard as lead; 
inland/wilderness search and rescue, with the Department of Interior as lead; and 
aeronautical search and rescue, with DoD as lead.130  US&R as it was originally 
configured stayed within ESF 9 and remains the sole responsibility of FEMA.   
US&R teams are of particular interest, because they are composed of state and 
local responders in a way that is closely aligned with the proposed LEDT concept.  
Additionally, because US&R teams were specifically mentioned as a model for the 
LEDT concept, analysis of this particular system is in order to determine its viability as a 
potential template for LEDT management. 
2. Team Deployment Concept 
A US&R team is comprised of local firemen, police officers, sheriff’s deputies, 
engineers and medical personnel etc., who have agreed as a group to take on the task of 
meeting FEMA training standards and accreditation procedures in order to gain the 
designation as a national US&R team.131  There are 28 task forces of 70 personnel across 
19 states housed in sponsor agencies such as local fire, police and sheriff departments 
who can be deployed anywhere in the United States and abroad within six hours of 
activation.132   
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In forming the national US&R concept, the federal government offered local 
governments specialized training and equipment for their first responders with the 
stipulation that local teams could be recalled and deployed by the federal government to 
assist in wider area events when necessary.  When needed nationally, like the DMAT, 
US&R teams are federalized, paid by FEMA and obtain benefits and indemnification 
protection as federal employees.133  The impetus for local governments to make their 
manpower available nationally was to gain specialized training and resources, which 
would be sustained through federal funds.  From 2001 to 2005, the federal government 
spent $182M for the 28 task forces or a little over $1M a year for each team.134  When 
deployed, teams are paid and reimbursed through the Disaster Relief Fund managed by 
FEMA.  This resource sharing relationship is a win/win for both the local and federal 
governments. 
US&R deployments are executed under the Urban Search and Rescue Response 
System within FEMA under the auspices of ESF 9.  Unlike DMATs, national US&R 
teams can only be deployed outside of their jurisdictional areas under a Stafford Act 
declaration.135  However, local resources may be deployed into the community by local 
governments or into other states with an EMAC deployment order.  Teams remain under 
the control of the local government for purposes of command and control, pay and 
benefits thus combining centralized management and decentralized execution.  Since 
there are multiple jurisdictions that can task these teams, it is important to have a solid 
management system that can provide an accurate picture of daily US&R status. 
3. Deployment History 
Since 1991, National US&R teams have been deployed to natural disasters like 
Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii, the Northridge Earthquake in Los Angeles, earthquakes in 
Turkey, tornadoes in Oklahoma and hurricane locations throughout the Gulf Coast.  
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Teams have also responded to man-made and terrorist events such as the DeBruce grain 
elevator explosion in Kansas, the Humberto Vidal building explosion in 1996, the Murrah 
Federal Building and the World Trade Center and Pentagon terror attacks.136  Teams are 
routinely deployed or placed on standby status to support national special security events 
as well.  Overall, since 1991, US&R teams have deployed to 28 major disasters and 12 
National Special Security Events.137  At the World Trade Center and Pentagon, 25 of 28 
teams were deployed while all 28 teams were activated in response to Katrina.138   
The World Trade Center and Pentagon response led to the debate about how 
effective teams were in the field.  At the Pentagon, US&R teams had previously worked 
closely with Arlington and District of Colombia first responders allowing for quick 
integration into the emergency operation upon arrival.139  New York City, on the other 
hand, had not previously worked with US&R teams and this lack of familiarity with 
US&R capabilities hurt the team’s overall effectiveness as they were sidelined for days in 
reserve or supporting status.140  The New York City situation was to some extent a 
function of a lack of a unified command structure at the disaster site and a “go it alone” 
approach to New York City’s emergency response.141  In both the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon responses, US&R teams arrived well prepared and in a timely manner to 
support the local government. 
The management of US&R response to Hurricane Katrina contrasted with the 
9/11 response.  Although overall search and rescue was heavily criticized, it was not due 
to poor performance by US&R teams themselves.  The problems rested in three areas.  
First, as was previously noted, ESF 9 did not encompass all forms of search and rescue 
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required during Katrina, which hampered overall coordination.  State, local, and multiple 
federal agencies were all conducting independent search and rescue operations for the 
first several days of the event.142  Despite NIMS that dictates a unified command 
structure, search and rescue simply was an uncoordinated effort.  Second, FEMA was 
criticized for not adequately prepositioning US&R resources before landfall.  FEMA 
responded that federal assistance protocol required the state to ask for a federal response 
before one is provided.143  Finally, teams were pre-staged too far away from the event.144  
It is debatable whether these errors were due to lack of ability of the Urban Search and 
Rescue Response management system, or were merely poor decisions by leaders in the 
heat of the moment.  In the end, US&R personnel did not criticize their management 
system as DMAT personnel did theirs after the Katrina response. 
4. Management System 
The National Urban Search and Rescue Response System is directly administered 
and executed by FEMA.  As of 2006, there were eight personnel at the FEMA level to 
conduct day to day US&R management activities and to respond during emergencies.  Of 
these eight full-time positions, only six were continuously filled.145  A DHS IG audit 
concluded this number was not enough to manage the system effectively on a daily basis, 
much less during emergency operations.  Congress funded eight additional positions to 
staff the management system, but FEMA was not able to fill them because they were only 
one-year positions.146  Funding does not seem to be a central issue.  From FY02 to FY04, 
Congress funded the US&R system with $152M for upgrades in readiness capability.147  
However, because the management system was not appropriately manned,  
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System program managers within FEMA did not adequately monitor or 
oversee the task forces’ compliance with preparedness grant requirements 
or determine whether the task forces achieved US&R System readiness 
objectives and standards.148 
Although FEMA had an established management system to provide oversight and 
direction for their teams, they did not provide the necessary manpower for it to be 
effective.  Basic oversight functions such as on-site operational visits had not been 
conducted up to FY04.  Task force compliance with grant specifications was done via 
cursory desk audits and there was no standardized reporting mechanism to conduct 
detailed analysis of task force capabilities.149  Since the management staff was also 
detailed to deploy during emergencies, the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005 left large 
periods when most US&R management functions were placed on hold.150   
At the local team level, the Inspector General report noted several management 
issues that detracted from the team’s effectiveness.  As with the national management 
system, the team management function required additional manpower to make it more 
effective.  Although grant funds were available to hire fills for four local management 
positions on each team, six of seven teams audited did not fill these positions.151  Instead, 
the grant money was used to execute other locally determined team goals.   
Degradation of team capabilities ranged across the broad functions of operational 
readiness, logistical readiness and management.  The audit reviewed seven teams; six of 
seven were below 50 percent of US&R standards for operational readiness due to 
shortfalls in mandatory training, medical requirements and team member availability.152  
In some cases, teams did not accurately keep track of team members who were 
unavailable due to vacation, injury or other reasons.  Maintenance of records, training and 
availability of canines were also problems.153  The IG audit team found all seven should 
                                                 







be rated below 70 percent in terms of logistics requirement and that inventory 
management and required performance of equipment maintenance were often not 
conducted.154    
At a minimum, if an effective management contingent were in place at the local 
and federal levels, most, if not all of the problems, could at least have been identified and 
an action plan developed to correct them.  In the IG findings, these problems were not 
completely known by team and FEMA-level leadership.  Perhaps this lack of situational 
awareness developed because the management mechanism did not provide relevant data 
to US&R leadership.   
5. Smart Practices 
On whole, and despite the deficiencies of its management system, US&R teams 
have performed brilliantly over the past 18 years.  With the increase in number and 
complexity of deployments, however, managerial deficiencies have become more 
apparent.  The IG audit report alludes to under-funding and a failure to grow manpower 
as causes of most of the current problems.155  Prior to the Hurricane Katrina response and 
Congressional hearings that followed, few, if any public documents were available to 
evaluate the capability and performance of the system.  Despite problems with funding 
and manpower that recent investigations have highlighted, however, some specific smart 
practices are apparent.   
Coupling central US&R asset management with the administrative mechanism to 
federalize and deploy assets by ESF 9 provides a robust “out the door” capability of six 
hours.  Although the LEDT concept does not define a specific response goal, this exceeds 
anything achieved under EMAC in the past and directly addresses problems noted with 
past LE sourcing and response.  EMAC does not have a central catalogue defining assets 
available for deployment as these catalogues are maintained separately by each state.156  
Centrally housing resource management for the LEDT in an ESF 13 entity circumvents 
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the need to go to each state emergency manager to find out what is available.  Also, under 
this management architecture, in a state to state request, ESF 13 could facilitate the flow 
of data to EMAC and help speed up the state response system as well.  This new 
architecture would directly address the causal factor of slow resourcing found in the 
Katrina response.157   
As written, LEDT planners are leaning toward EMAC as the sole force deployer 
for both state and federal response.  EMAC does not contain functional LE experts and is 
not manned to conduct management of functional area capabilities; they broker requests 
for support.158  In the case of US&R and ESF 9, by centrally managing the nation’s 
US&R response capability, they have the God’s eye capability to see what resources are 
available along with its status.  They can affect a coordinated response without waiting to 
see who comes on line via EMAC.  A central management system within the LEDT 
construct would provide the same ability to provide a rapid LE response capability.  This 
system would help place the LE community on par with other large national responders 
in terms of information flow and response ability.  Potential benefits could include 
facilitation of a synchronized national response of first responders superior to what was 
encountered during Katrina.   
A properly manned and funded central management system could also provide a 
clearer national common operating picture through day-to-day tracking, status reporting 
and deployment of assets.  Strong consideration should be given to locate the LEDT 
management function where it can best achieve synergistic benefits from the other major 
national response capabilities.  Using EMAC as the force deployer could dissipate the 
required synergy, because EMAC rotates the chair and deployment coordinator annually 
from state to state.159  US&R teams have had no problems deploying to the field in a 
timely manner.  Adoption of elements of their system may alleviate past response 
problems and build the capacity for future advanced national deployment of first 
responders.   
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The US&R community previously used an advisory committee in developing 
response system policy and procedures as well as the development of certification 
standards for their national teams.  This committee was made up of sponsor agency 
chiefs, technical and emergency management experts as well as representatives from 
DHS and FEMA providing all stakeholders a voice in the process.160  It appears that this 
committee disbanded as overall US&R management began to erode; however, there have 
been calls to bring it back as soon as possible.161  The development of an advisory 
committee within the LEDT system could be important to ensure all participants in the 
National LEDT system can help shape the new LEDT capability. Additional 
consideration should be given to formalizing a branch of this body as an accrediting 
authority for LEDTs and their sponsor agencies as was done with US&R teams.  This 
would ensure standards are agreed upon and underwritten from within the community.  
This body would help to operationalize standardization across the teams in order to 
achieve a plug-and-play or building-block methodology in force-packaging and support.  
ILEAS is already effectively using such a committee, as will be discussed in the next 
section. 
As also addressed in the DMAT smart practices section, the LEDT should be 
treated as a federal asset.  As with DMAT and US&R teams, this status drives a resource 
and funding relationship where initial equipment caches and sustainment funds are 
provided by the federal government while team reimbursement for deployment comes 
directly via the federal disaster relief fund.  Leaving the LEDT under the EMAC 
deployment mechanism may cloud its status as a national asset and make resourcing 
more difficult to establish and sustain.   
The downside to this approach is that some may view these officers as federal 
agents or a national police force.  A potential solution could be for receiving states to pre-
agree to deputize these forces upon arrival or through activation agreements while  
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leaving them on the federal books for indemnity and pay purposes.  A federally supported 
deployment of state resources under the guise of the national LEDT does not have to 
equate to a national police force. 
Both DMAT and US&R management systems fell short during the Katrina 
response but so too did decentralized state and local response systems.  Evaluating 
FEMA management systems on the Katrina response alone may not give an accurate 
picture of their capabilities, especially considering the successful responses these systems 
facilitated prior to Katrina.  NDMS was a management system in decline; weak points 
were merely brought to light on a national scale.  The US&R management system 
appears to have been sound up to Katrina as far as can be determined through available 
documentation.  However, both systems failed largely because of lack of manpower and 
funding at the local and national levels.   
D. ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT ALARM SYSTEM (ILEAS)162 
1. Mission 
The Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System, a unique state response mechanism 
that provides a real-world illustration of central asset management, policy formulation 
and planning, coupled with decentralized responders who are locally owned and 
controlled, may throw some additional light on the question of response management.   
ILEAS is a single point, state-level management system for Illinois LE that 
aggressively centralizes the functions of planning, management, funding, budgeting, 
equipping, exercising and dispatch of field response to facilitate unified action by 880 
separate and jurisdictionally independent LE agencies.  Under ILEAS, these 880 separate 
agencies constitute a synergistic state-wide police system capable of supporting stricken 
jurisdictions by mobilizing neighboring agencies, or rapidly deploying specially trained 
and equipped forces to quell civil disturbances, protect assets, or provide a special tactics 
response.163  As the sole LE point of contact for the entire state, ILEAS mobilizes forces 
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for state-to-state support under EMAC, or to support national special security events as 
they not only have the centralized database but are also the deployment mechanism, 
much like in the US&R management system.164  The deployable team concept achieved 
by ILEAS is what is envisioned for the National LEDT system, and ILEAS represents a 
near exact microcosm of what the national LEDT concept is trying to achieve overall.   
The origins of ILEAS can be traced back to two previous Illinois intrastate mutual 
aid agencies.165  The first is the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) that started in 
the 1960s.  MABAS is an EMS/fire-centric mutual aid system that was well ahead of its 
time.  Today, all MABAS participants sign an aid agreement that directs a standardized 
incident command system, dictates minimum manning, and standardizes equipment and a 
common radio system with pre-agreed terminology.166  The MABAS agreement also 
facilitates local mutual aid without the declaration of a statewide emergency.  Under 
Illinois statute, responders are indemnified in a state-declared emergency, which helps to 
facilitate an outside response free from legal concerns.167  On the federal level, a similar 
and less comprehensive system was not implemented until almost forty years later.   
The second mutual aid system that helped form ILEAS arose from severe 
flooding in the Chicago area in 1982.168  This event made it apparent that local LE 
resources were stretched too thin to cope with a major disaster.  As a result, fifteen 
Chicago municipal area police departments joined in 1983 to form the Northern Illinois 
Police Alarm System (NIPAS), based on MABAS.169  NIPAS is a regional 
intergovernmental mutual aid agreement that allows LE dispatch and support to  
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communities from outside the stricken jurisdiction.  The system is based on a series of 
alarm conditions from one to ten, which determines how many people will respond to 
which pre-arranged rally point within the requesting jurisdiction.170  
2. Team Deployment Concept 
After 9/11, the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police became interested in 
developing a statewide LE mutual aid system based upon the tenets of these earlier 
mutual aid organizations.171 The result, stood up in 2002, is ILEAS, which is a 
management organization and not a tactical team.  It manages the state’s LE mutual aid 
compact, and is comprised of 880 local governments including all 102 sheriffs and 778 
police departments throughout the state.172  The mechanics of an ILEAS deployment are 
simple.  Each LE agency has their own web page that links them into the central system.  
The emergency response plan for each jurisdiction is loaded into the web-based system 
and can be viewed by responders statewide and by the central ILEAS dispatch center.  
Plans are standardized and include rally points, maps, contact information for 
prearranged out-of-area responders, radio frequencies, contingency actions and so forth.  
When a request for assistance is made, the ILEAS central dispatcher pulls up the 
requesting agency’s emergency plan and starts to execute it by immediately feeding data 
to responding agencies.  If the local jurisdiction’s pre-plan does not provide enough pre-
arranged resources for the type of problem encountered, the ILEAS dispatcher expands 
the resource pool by dispatching from outlying areas.173  
Deploying packages of individual officers from one jurisdiction to another is the 
most basic tenet of mutual aid.  The next level of assistance involves dispatching actual 
teams with advanced capabilities that bring specialized skills, equipment and training to 
bear against larger problems.  With this in mind, jurisdictions under ILEAS have formed 
16 multi-jurisdictional teams of 30 to 60 officers with specialized skills in SWAT, WMD 
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response and crowd control.174  The ILEAS management system helps formalize these 
specialized team’s abilities by directing standardized training, exercising, equipping and 
operational policy.175   
ILEAS provides centralized equipment and resource management, a concept 
LEDT planners are attempting to define.  Under the compact, agencies are required to 
submit a list of their equipment and supply resources.  This list is visible to both the 
ILEAS dispatch center and participating agencies, which can search for specific pieces of 
equipment by zip code.  System-retrieved information provides locations, contact names 
and phone numbers.176  Agencies can search for needed resources statewide thus 
leveraging specialized equipment purchased with state and federal money by making it 
available to all; Peoria has the same access to resources as Chicago.   
3. Deployment History 
ILEAS dispatches about 70 state activations a year and also dispatched a total of 
300 officers in support of the Hurricane Katrina response.  One hundred and fifty officers 
from 113 local and state agencies were prepared to deploy to Louisiana within 72 
hours.177  Since all training, equipping, uniforms and command structure are identical, 
officers can be pulled from across the state in small numbers so not to over-tax any one 
department and still provide a coherent external response capability.178  As officers 
dispatched within the ILEAS system were trained together and equipped in a like fashion, 
they presented a professional and well-organized force that was lauded by officials in 
Louisiana and attracted attention from law enforcement planners at the national level.179  
ILEAS support has not only been used for mutual aid and EMAC response to 
emergencies, but is also used to support national special security events.  Recently, 
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Illinois was asked by the state of Minnesota to support the Republican National 
Convention because ILEAS is known for its professional regional-level response 
capability.180 
4. Management System 
ILEAS functions much as NDMS does for the medical community.  ILEAS is a 
grant management and coordination organization that centrally manages statewide LE 
mutual aid within Illinois and also performs central planning, team standards 
determination, shipment of contingency supplies, exercise management and acts as the 
primary contact for EMAC requests for LE assistance outside the state.181   
A staff of seven full-time and 20 part-time contractors, who are posted throughout 
the state, mans the management systems.182  The ILEAS staff is larger than the entire 
staff for the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System and about half the size 
of the entire National Disaster Medical System staff during the Katrina period.  The 
ILEAS also has a governing board comprised of five elected executive officers all sitting 
Illinois police chiefs or sheriffs, 16 regional co-chairs from departments within the eight 
Illinois regions, and representatives from the Illinois State Police, Chicago Police 
Department, as well as the Illinois Sheriff’s and Police Chiefs Associations.183  This body 
effectively extends the ILEAS staff from 20 to 41 members all with intimate knowledge 
of Illinois law enforcement needs.  This inclusive system allows Illinois LE agencies 
down to the department level to have a voice in how ILEAS operates.  It is perhaps this 
inclusiveness that has been the strength of ILEAS as delivery of LE services comes from 
a single coordinated agency across the state versus delivery by a patchwork of fiefdoms.   
ILEAS works to give Illinois LE a single voice in other important areas.  First, it 
is the sole voice and face of LE to the Illinois Terrorism Task Force.  It works with other 
state emergency responder communities to develop a single integrated response plan 
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supported by state budget allocations.184  If support is requested for response outside of 
the state, ILEAS has the single common operating picture of Illinois LE, which allows it 
to respond in a uniquely rapid and deliberate fashion.   
The ILEAS management system is a good candidate to serve as a template for the 
National LEDT management system because Illinois is effectively executing all of the 
central tenets the LEDT concept paper addresses.  However, the Achilles heal of ILEAS 
is funding.  ILEAS is funded by federal State Homeland Security and Law Enforcement 
Terrorism Prevention Grants to the tune of $60M, and by the State of Illinois at $125K 
and from member dues at $40K.185  If there is a drop in federal funding, the conclusion is 
easy, ILEAS may cease to exist.186 
5. Smart Practices 
A review of two major smart practices of the ILEAS management system partially 
explains why this response concept has been so successful and may aid in developing a 
robust LEDT management system. 
From the operational perspective, a key strength of ILEAS is complete 
participation by all Illinois LE agencies, which breaks down independent jurisdictional 
islands and fuses them into a consolidated statewide effort.  However, ILEAS is not a 
monolithic governmental management system that issues orders to lower echelons.  
ILEAS consists of a federation of participants who have been elected regionally by 
member departments.187  It is through this governing board that independent LE agencies 
retain their voice and can directly impact the decision process.  Once ILEAS management 
decisions are agreed on, each agency is expected to execute them.  While management 
activities are centralized, jurisdictions retain control of their LE agencies. 
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From the management and logistics perspective, statewide buy-in allows for a 
centralized approach towards major parts of LE operations, including local mutual aid 
dispatch and external emergency response.  Like DMAT and US&R, ILEAS uses central 
funding as a carrot for participation and enforcement of mutually agreed standards.  
Efficiencies in this central approach can be seen in several areas.  For example, ILEAS 
has centralized the purchase of standardized gas masks for every LE responder using 
state and federal funds and also purchased the same radio system for all.188  ILEAS staff 
and the management committee determine what capabilities they believe Illinois LE 
agencies require.  They then purchase and distribute equipment to support these central 
goals.   
In the old decentralized management system, each department would receive their 
proportional part of overall funding and pursue independent, non-linked goals.  Purchases 
that require a great deal of knowledge or experience may be especially difficult to 
execute properly in smaller jurisdictions.  In a central system, larger blocks of funds 
expand the range of what can be purchased while larger staffs of experts have the 
knowledge to purchase more robust systems so that local departments receive better 
products that are also integrated with equipment in neighboring jurisdictions.  This 
methodology is repeated across the other core team development areas such as training, 
planning and operational tactics. 
Towns or regions that can afford to often form SWAT or similar tactical teams to 
provide an advanced LE capability.  These teams typically have different training and 
equipping standards, different levels of experience and varying policies and procedures in 
how they operate.  When such teams are meshed into a joint operation, serious problems 
can occur.  ILEAS solves this problem by establishing standardized operational policy, 
identical training and equipping standards and by convening statewide team commander 
meetings to facilitate collaboration.189   
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ILEAS, as a LE management system, has effectively centralized planning, 
programming, budgeting, equipping and training support to facilitate standardized and 
rapid dispatch of LE resources throughout the state of Illinois and beyond.  The keys to 
its success are adequate funding, appropriate staffing, a total and inclusive governing 
board and strategic planning and execution of support functions.  The tactical teams 
functioning under ILEAS are virtually identical to what is envisioned in the LEDT 
concept paper.  To develop a national capability properly, LEDT planners should closely 
study the ILEAS management system and adapt its methods to the national level as 
appropriate.   
E. U.S. AIR FORCE SECURITY FORCES190  
1. Mission 
The U.S. Air Force Security Forces originated in 1947 as the Air Police to provide 
law enforcement, security and corrections services to the Air Force.  In 1997, the name of 
the career field changed to Security Forces (SF) to recognize the expeditionary or 
deployment culture of the career field.  There are approximately 40,000 SF members 
today assigned to SF squadrons and groups throughout the world.  These units range from 
100 to 600 personnel each.  SF units are structured much like any other police department 
across America.  They also protect critical assets such as weapons platforms, people and 
key military operations through security patrols, advanced weapons systems, 
sophisticated monitoring capabilities and other security aids.   
Air Force SF units regularly move special teams from their fixed units and bases 
to expeditionary locations not only in time of need but during normal rotations of 
personnel, to either bolster existing units or to form new units to protect forward air bases 
and special missions.  This concept of force employment is very similar to what is 
envisioned in the LEDT, which will deploy packages of officers from the cities or units  
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who own them to areas that require additional manpower.  Given the expertise SF has 
amassed over the past 48 years, LEDT concept planners could benefit from studying this 
system.  
2. Team Deployment Concept 
In order to provide a measured and accurate response to likely crises, war 
planners study probable scenarios and develop appropriate manpower and logistics 
requirements to answer the call.  Once scenario X occurs, leaders take the plan off the 
shelf, make adjustments for the current situation and deploy force packages based upon 
previous deliberate planning.  This is a concept captured to some extent by ILEAS 
through its web-based security plans and predesigned lateral response options.  However, 
neither EMAC nor the current LEDT concept use prepackaged forces against expected 
and preplanned scenarios. 
In the deliberate planning phase, war planners fill the entire manpower 
requirement of all prepackaged plans by assigning deployment taskings to every SF unit 
in the Air Force.191  Care is taken to ensure these units can continue to perform their 
primary mission on the home base once the deployed manpower is removed.  SF units 
traditionally have a standing deployment mission or tasking to provide a particular 
capability, such as a security flight of 44 personnel, a law enforcement squad of 13 
personnel, K-9 units, or heavy weapons teams.  Since deployed security squadrons are 
formed from parts of various fixed units, it is imperative that disparate parts be similarly 
trained, equipped, uniformed and certified in their positions and that they operate under 
the same doctrine.192  This is another concept used by ILEAS and is no different from 
what the LEDT concept envisions. 
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3. Deployment History 
Since the Korean War, and through the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Security Forces have been deployed to protect forward air bases.  Missions have ranged 
from protecting the confines of the forward air base to exterior operations such as convoy 
security and reconnaissance patrols.  Today, approximately 4,000 Air Force SF members 
are deployed to 200 locations worldwide.193   
Although SF deployments may be more frequent or in larger numbers than a 
typical DMAT, US&R or ILEAS deployment, the basics are the same; moving people out 
of various permanent organizations to form a single deployable expeditionary capability 
to conduct operations in austere and chaotic environments. 
4. Management System 
The Air Force’s central management system is used to plan and move all Air 
Force resources including SF.  This highly complex system is a module of the overall 
DoD system which allows for an integrated deployment of forces across the services.  
Adoption of a similar system in civilian response planning could be valuable in 
integrating medical, fire and law enforcement teams in a domestic response in the future.  
The Air Force system can be boiled down to a few parts relevant to managing and 
deploying civilian LE. 
a.  Resource Typing 
All deployable manpower and logistics capabilities of Air Force SF are 
packaged into hundreds of standardized capability sets or unit type codes (UTCs) such as 
a 13 person LE team, a 44 person security team, a LE equipment package etc.194  Each 
UTC has training requirements and other specific standards that make one 13 man team 
identical to the other.  The entire deployable capability of SF is broken down into these 
capability sets and placed into a mobilization plan or catalogue for planners to use to fill 
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the requirements of preset plans.195  This is not unlike the resource-typing concept 
explained in the LEDT concept.  However, SF resources are typed to be used in support 
of pre-identified plans.  There are few preset or prepackaged plans in civilian response 
that detail-resourcing requirements to the degree military plans do.  As written, the LEDT 
model merely details a loose catalogue of desired capabilities based upon volunteer 
participants. 
b.  Preset Mission Plans 
Preset Plans termed operational plans (OPLAN) are developed for a range 
of expected scenarios.  For example, in the civilian case, there could be an OPLAN for a 
hurricane with specific chapters for each state and annexes for specific cities within the 
states detailing the response requirements for each level.  With the military, these 
OPLANs detail a raw list of overall manpower and logistics necessary to execute the 
mission requirements for the given scenario, without designating from where this 
manpower and logistics come; it is simply the defined requirement to do the job.196 
c.  Matching Requirements to Resources 
Once the manpower requirement is defined in the OPLAN, planners then 
match the raw resource requirements listed in the OPLANS from the list of overall 
available resources in the mobilization plan.  These documents are called time phased 
force deployment documents and detail specifically who is going to fill each UTC 
requirement in the OPLAN, what the cargo requirements are, how it is going to get to the 
scene and any other details to employ the resources for the mission.197  Having learned 
the lessons of Katrina, FEMA recently released the 2008 FEMA Hurricane Contingency 
Plan that identifies resource considerations and is on the edge of military-level deliberate 
planning though it does not go so far as to pre-package teams.198   
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d.  Tracking Resources 
After resources are matched to requirements, units are issued a mission 
document statement that details what UTCs they are required to provide along with 
detailed instructions of what they must be capable of performing.199  This allows units to 
execute training plans and other sustainment activities to ensure they can deploy these 
capabilities within the directed timeframe.   
Unit commanders are required to submit a monthly report that outlines the 
health of UTC capabilities.200  If there are conditions where the capability cannot be 
deployed within the specified requirements such as not enough people, missing 
equipment, or lack of training, this information is immediately reported along with when 
the condition will be fixed.201  Force planners are then able to see the daily status of 
available forces and equipment and make tasking adjustments based upon the reporting. 
e.  Deployment Execution 
When resources are called up based on the time phased force deployment 
listing associated with an OPLAN, units are notified by a warning order to prepare to 
deploy, the logistics plan to move the units and equipment are readied and units are 
notified to deploy via an execution order.  All of these actions are conducted by the Air 
Expeditionary Forces Center.  This center acts as the NDMS or ILEAS of the Air Force 
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This is a simplistic description of the deployment process, but is presented 
to demonstrate that a deliberate process is helpful to provide a calculated and measured 
response in times of crisis.  This deliberate planning precludes the need to send an 
EMAC-like broadcast to see whom or what is available.  Such capability is simply not 
found to this degree in civilian emergency response plans, but perhaps it should. 
5. Smart Practices 
An appropriately funded and staffed, central planning and management system 
support Air Force Security Forces with the ability to develop detailed contingency plans 
and closely monitor teams to surge forces in response to crises.  Such planning takes the 
panic out of response, as units know what they are tasked to do, have trained for the 
mission, are equipped to execute this support and know how they are getting to the 
incident before it occurs.  No one unit is slated to handle the entire problem.  An 
integrated approach executed by various units with a range of capabilities is synchronized 
to act as a single task force to accomplish the overall objective.  This level of 
synchronization is not found in civilian response despite the best intentions of the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS).  NIMS unifies command by providing 
an integrated command structure, but the incident commander does not typically know 
beforehand who is going to respond and with what capabilities.  In the civilian 
community, available forces usually have not trained together, nor have they 
synchronized the individual roles within the combined operation as was noted with the 
New York Fire and Police Departments.202  
Within the civilian scheme, response plans are typically developed within the 
individual first responder lanes.  Responders are deployed by unconnected agencies and 
their execution of operations on the ground continues to be stove-piped by function, thus 
complicating requirement to coordinate actions on the scene.203  This condition was seen 
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during the Katrina response particularly within the search and rescue community.204  The 
LEDT capability, once captured under a single management system, should be further 
leveraged through deliberate planning and force packaging by scenario.  Such exercises 
could eventually facilitate a synchronized response with other first responder 
communities. 
Within the homeland, reactive response to large scale crises almost always begin 
by mobilizing expanding rings of support from disconnected state and local jurisdictions 
during which valuable time is consumed until it becomes apparent a federal response is 
necessary.  This two-stage process makes it even more critical that the federal response is 
swift, deliberate, accurately measured and efficient when it hits the ground.  Without 
robust management of resources and deliberate planning, it is much more difficult to 
deliver the proper response.  A good example of a defined response was the most recent 
deployment in support of Hurricane Gustav in 2008.  The federal government did not 
wait for local governments to exhaust resources and ask for help; many supplies, teams 
and equipment were prepositioned well in advance.205  A coherent pre-response was 
executed based on lessons learned from Katrina and may be the first indication of 
changes in planning considerations.   
There is no need to start from scratch in developing the National LEDT 
management system.  Other FEMA management systems as well as ILEAS and military 
deliberate planning models provide many examples both good and bad from which much 
can be learned.  Development of a central management system coupled with a military-
style deliberate planning model could help LE planners develop the necessary national 
LEDT capability to meet anticipated homeland security dilemmas, understand the exact 
status of this capability on a daily basis, and provide robust prearranged delivery 
platforms to get the force to the fight.  
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V. EVALUATED ALTERNATIVES AND PROJECTED 
OUTCOMES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 911 Commission Report warns that a failure in imagination may be the 
leading cause of the country’s poor response to the September 2001 attacks.206  Author 
Donald Kettle warns that looking back in order to devise strategies to combat asymmetric 
problems may doom us to failure.207  Charles Wise’s research indicates “when 
technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment 
creates uncertainty, organizations are often modeled on other organizations.”208  LEDT 
planners should consider these warnings when developing the LEDT management system 
as the current concept heavily favors tenets of DMAT and US&R legacy programs whose 
management systems have proven less than capable at times.   
Given these warnings, a “more of the same” strategy may not be the best 
approach to develop the LEDT management system; however, it remains prudent to learn 
from history by evaluating the current models capitalizing on their smart practices while 
exposing practices to avoid.  Any “bold new” approach to LEDT management would also 
benefit from this methodology.  With both points in mind, the intent of this work is to use 
the reviewed management systems as starting points versus end points. 
Before reviewing potential LEDT management system options, certain evaluative 
criteria must be selected to help analyze current program capabilities.  A survey of the 
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literature on emergency response illuminated prominent elements experts believe 
exacerbate conditions of poor response management.  These elements will be used as the 
evaluative measures when reviewing the alternative management systems.   
Numerous authors have given their evaluation of why the U.S. response system 
has not worked properly in the past.  Kettle among others says coordination is the root of 
the problem and is also the method to fix it.209  Louise Comfort emphasizes that 
organizations require a shared goal while noting that tensions between public safety and 
individual rights are still of concern.210  William Waugh blames the federal structure 
itself for slow response to requests for help.211  Kiki Caruson and Susan MacManus 
among others note the extreme difficulty in integrating multiple agencies and 
jurisdictions in a chaotic environment and suggest regional response.212  Brian Gerber, 
David Cohen, Brian Cannon, Dennis Patterson and Kendra Stewart reveal agencies often 
lack administrative and management capacity for effective policies and actions.213   
How a proposed management system addresses these areas may be an indication 
of its potential success.  Additionally, assessment of two other factors, resistance of the 
LE community to the new system and potential political objections could be telling as to 
the likelihood of the new system’s acceptance by internal and external audiences.  
Without conducting on-site studies or extensive interviews, value judgments of these 
evaluative elements will be made based upon the research of others revealed in the 
previous chapter’s case studies.   
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B. ALTERNATIVE ONE:  A FEDERAL CENTRAL MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM  
1. Evaluative Criteria 
The LEDT concept largely employs both DMAT and US&R tenets.  Review of 
the evaluative criteria will provide insight to what could be expected if the LEDT were 
served by this style of management system. 
a. Coordination   
Under the federal structure, coordination between response teams and their 
management systems have proven weak during both emergency conditions and day-to-
day activities.  When tested by response to catastrophic events, NDMS was not in sync 
with the teams it was designed to serve.  During Hurricane Katrina, there were 
coordination disconnects between responding forces, the deployment system and 
personnel requesting forces, resulting in teams not being effectively employed.214  
Additionally, there were large gaps in coordination that left teams without equipment, 
transport or direction.  Prior to 2002, team leaders warned that the lack of common 
operating documents necessary for coordinated actions were not available for DMAT 
leaders.215   
US&R management also showed an inability to coordinate day-to-day 
activities as status reports were not being sent up the chain, management personnel did 
not have the ability to assess team readiness levels, and managers did not review team 
performance reports due to a lack of standardized processes.216  It was assessed by the 
DHS IG that these coordination problems could significantly; negatively impact the 
team’s ability to respond.   
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The literature reveals ineffective coordination is the leading problem in 
emergency management; but why?  An overarching explanation with regard to the federal 
central management system is poor organization structure.  As designed, locally owned 
and controlled teams “answer” to a federal management activity that has no authority 
over the resources it manages.  James Carroll comments that terrorism cuts across 
distinctions between foreign, domestic, public, and private; and one could also add 
federal and state.  This “mismatch results in disconnect between jurisdictions, capability 
and threat and ultimately who is responsible for what.”217  This is a dilemma best solved 
through organizational redesign to enhance coordination.  Additional detractors found in 
the federal system that inhibited it from executing its general coordination responsibilities 
were severe under-manning and under-funding. 
b. Shared Goals 
The centrally shared goal between response teams and their federal 
management system is to facilitate a response to local communities who lack the organic 
capability or capacity to respond.  Without shared goals, there is not anything to 
coordinate as jurisdictions would be left to their own disparate activities.  There is little 
debate this central shared goal between the two levels of government drive common 
actions; however, the bond is only loosely driven by its desire to serve the community 
versus being driven by a unifying organizational design or command and control 
structure.  The National Incident Management System integrates actions during the 
emergency.  However, before the emergency, there are no formal chains of command to 
drive these goals nor are there formal or informal structures such as stakeholder attended 
steering groups or governing and advisory committees to compel member actions.  As 
federalism is designed, states and local authorities respond to local events supported as 
necessary by a resource-coordinating effort from the federal management system.  In the 
inter-period between emergency response and day-to-day operations, interactions 
between the federal government and local governments are based on a relationship of 
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resource requirements.  From the federal perspective, shared goals are coerced through 
the promise of grant money; whereas states and local jurisdictions participate in these 
goals to the degree they need the federal assistance.  This loose structure of activity 
driven by resource needs does not provide the necessary framework to coordinate 
strategic efforts, develop common strategy or guide tactical actions effectively. 
c. Structure of the System 
The federal management system is structured in the U.S. federalist 
tradition: loose federal coordination with decentralized response by state, local and 
private entities.  When states request help through federal coordination they are bolstered 
by external assistance, mostly by responders who are also state, local and private entities.  
Although federalism is maintained under this approach, debate has raged as to its 
continued effectiveness.  Kettl points out that while Arlington and New York performed 
brilliantly during 9/11, other jurisdictions may not have faired as well.218  Should the 
country’s emergency response be based upon pockets of excellence engineered by 
personalities or should a formal organizational structure be designed to achieve a robust 
and more standardized approach?   
NIMS attempts to provide some standardization but through fragmented 
jurisdictions and lose structures where the county option is still the norm.  The loose 
federal management of response teams facilitates the delivery of forces but it is not strong 
enough to dictate the level of capability of these forces beyond the hold it has through 
grant money as was repetitively shown in the DMAT and US&R systems.  Florence 
Heffron says “centralization is both a virtue and a vice in the hierarchy of American 
political values.”219  The question becomes: given the normal organizational costs 
associated with decentralized management (redundancy, limited specialization, 
problematic command and control, etc.) can such methods adequately serve the 
emergency response community given the scale of the perils it confronts?  To which may 
be added a second question:  are these well-recognized elements of weakness really 
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conductive to the preservation of American liberties?  To the extent that the answer to 
either question is “No,” more thought should be put into stronger centralized 
management while maintaining decentralized execution.  
d. Integration of Agencies Prior to Incident 
The federal management system performed well in achieving operational 
capabilities that had not existed in the past as illustrated by the development of 
specialized DMAT and US&R teams.  This was largely accomplished through resource 
agreements based on the attainment of minimum performance standards.  The real test, 
however, is deployment and integration of these teams into a unified response.  Once 
teams are formed, how effective is the management system in integrating the capability 
throughout the specialized function, and within the larger national response system? 
Although teams are guided by standardized requirements laid out by the 
management activity, not all teams are equally capable.  Differences in capability and 
readiness have generally been driven by two overarching factors: manning/funding and 
individual personalities.  In the case of US&R, although the management system directed 
particular manning levels and provided the resources, individual teams chose how they 
wanted to expend funding and standardized regimens were not followed.220  Similar 
problems were found with DMATs.  NDMS lacked standardized protocols and roles, 
responsibilities and authority were not understood causing a loose confederation of 
members rather than an integrated and standardized response capability.221  Overall, the 
management system lacked the ability to integrate standard capabilities throughout the 
function. 
The larger problem of the management system has been integration of 
these teams in a national response.  Once deployed, additional management teams are 
also deployed to integrate DMAT and US&R capabilities into local response structures.  
However, these integration teams have proven to be ineffective because the right 
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personnel have not always been used and local structures take precedent in authority.222  
The President of the International Association of Fire Chiefs and Chairman of the 
National Troopers Association believe federally mandated regionalism could fix this 
problem by pooling blocks of resources and forcing collaboration.223  Under this concept, 
the players remain the same but a regional structure is installed to increase effectiveness 
in coordination and integration of resources before the emergency occurs. 
e. Administrative and Management Capacity 
The DMAT and US&R management systems showed serious problems in 
administrative and management capacity.  In NDMS, most of the capacity was hobbled 
by reduced funding made by conscious decisions to funnel resources to other areas.224  
Manpower was also stripped down to one third of its previous amount.  These actions 
depleted NDMS’ ability to coordinate actions within the DMAT protocols and negatively 
impacted its ability to integrate teams into the local structures after deployment. 
The DHS IG report illustrated serious problems in administration and 
management capacity with the US&R response system.  Like NDMS, US&R suffered 
from improper manning of their positions both locally and nationally and from improper 
funding.  The IG report indicates these elements were the chief culprits in a host of 
management, funding and operational miscues.   
Without a commitment by DHS and FEMA, who were undergoing their 
own challenges, it was unlikely NDMS or US&R could put together a coherent program 
for effective team management.  As stated by Waugh, “the federal system itself acts to 
inhibit coherent and comprehensive disaster preparedness efforts because of conflicting  
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incentives of management, coordination and uneven resources.”225  Again, new structures 
and resource allocation should be considered to increase administration and management 
capacity. 
f. Acceptance by the LE Community 
In an interview of several unnamed LEDT planners, the LE community is 
least likely to accept a central DHS or FEMA management system that simply issues 
directives and tasks local LE resources from Washington, no matter how effective this 
system promises to be.  Without significant state control of teams, or at a minimum a 
management committee of locally or regionally elected stakeholders intimately involved 
in the National LEDT management system, this option is not likely to be accepted by the 
internal LE community. 
g. Political Objections  
Political objection to centralizing LE is rooted in the American tradition of 
federalism to protect individual freedom and liberty first.  Local control of LE has always 
been the desire of local political leaders as well.  This premise goes back to the debate 
illustrated in Chapter I.  If a central federal management option were pursued, an 
information campaign would be required to illustrate that such a system would not impact 
decentralized ownership or control of local LE forces.   
2. Projected Outcome 
Simply adopting a central DHS/FEMA style management system could be 
considered a failure in imagination as this is the status quo option of emergency response 
management altered only by adding LE in the equation.  Without injection of a solid 
budget and management staff, it is unlikely to yield any different results than NDMS or 
the US&R Response System provided from 2002 to 2006.  Finally, without a common  
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structure that clearly delineates authority and shared responsibility, the elements of 
coordination, integration of forces and management capacity remain limiting factors to 
efficiency and effectiveness.   
C. ALTERNATIVE TWO:  ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT ALARM 
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM226 
1. Evaluative Criteria 
ILEAS is a statewide LE management system that provides the foundation for LE 
mutual aid across Illinois.  It also underwrites deployable tactical response team 
capability and performance by directing minimum standards through mutually agreed 
upon regulations as well as training and equipping criteria.  This system addresses the 
major areas of concerns in the LEDT concept.   
a. Coordination   
Coordination is the bedrock of ILEAS and is perhaps the key to its 
success.  Coordination under ILEAS smartly ties together the remaining evaluative 
criteria in the following sections to provide a consolidated system of management for 
effective execution of both management and emergency response objectives.  Resource 
management, policy development and strategic planning are centrally coordinated efforts 
under ILEAS, not unlike what is found in a military structure.  ILEAS is made up of a 
central management organization with a clearly delineated coordination chain to speed 
decision making and policy implementation from the management organization down to 
individual departments for decentralized execution.   
Illinois is divided into eight emergency management regions.  Each of the 
880 departments within these regions is represented first by a regional board of ILEAS 
officers who coordinate regional LE issues.  Next, each region has two representatives 
that sit on the ILEAS central governing board.  This design ensures an avenue for 
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coordination up and down the chain as well as for representation of all stakeholders; an 
element lacking in the current federal structure.  ILEAS smartly breaks the barriers of an 
“us and them” management relationship through employment of a participative 
management structure. 
Coordination of the emergency response itself occurs smoothly as ILEAS 
provides a tactical command and control web to ensure near-instant dispatch of unified 
forces across the state via an inclusive information architecture.  Mutual aid relies on 
effective pre-coordination to preclude trading business cards at the scene of the 
emergency.  ILEAS circumvents this condition by requiring jurisdictions to coordinate 
with each other through the creation of a formal web accessible emergency mutual aid 
plan.  This plan can be seen by all 880 jurisdictions and provides the expected needs of 
the jurisdiction prior to an emergency while linking neighboring jurisdictions, 
jurisdictions to regions and regions to each other.227  This web of plans provides 
coordination to unify the state’s emergency response from the smallest department and 
jurisdiction to the largest.   
b. Shared Goals 
Shared goals between response agencies are what cement the possibility of 
a unified response.  The overarching shared goal amongst all Illinois LE agencies is to 
provide public safety for the state.  This goal starts with the building block of each law 
enforcement agency providing public safety services to their own constituents as seen in 
other states.  However, ILEAS takes the process a step further as these building blocks 
are interlaced with each other up to and through regional relationships via the emergency 
mutual aid plans.  Each LE agency is reliant on the others for response or provision of 
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One could make similar claims regarding other states as most states have 
intra-state mutual aid agreements.  However, few if any, are as robust as Illinois’ and 
none go the next step with an ILEAS management organization that provides a common 
architecture for planning, policy and resource management and allocation.228 
c. Structure of the System 
Louise Comfort identifies a major detractor to effective emergency 
response by claiming “little attention has been given to structuring inter-organizational 
response to events on regional levels.”229  Her solution is premised upon organizational 
capacity to respond based upon adaptive processes, which go back to Stuart Kauffman 
and evolution theory.  She says “self organization or the ability to reallocate resources 
and action to meet changing demands from the environment” is a key component to 
success in this policy area.230 
ILEAS was designed to address this exact dilemma.  The ILEAS 
management organization resources individual jurisdictions to act beyond the role of an 
individual node by providing unified plans, policy and integrated resources to enable a 
networked regional response.  As the elements of the emergency change, these pre-
coordinated response plans are adaptive and scalable allowing the dispatcher to adjust 
deployment of forces by including additional jurisdictions until enough forces and 
resources are on-scene to handle the problem.  The dispatcher has the authority to execute 
the initial response plan without verification from any higher authority.231  Follow-on 
forces are deployed as long as the responsible LE agency in the stricken jurisdiction 
requests them.  This is the basic concept of all mutual aid and responses by state and local 
resources…rings of response that expand from the stricken jurisdiction up to federal 
assistance if necessary.  The difference with ILEAS is the mutual aid is pre-arranged, can 
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be called for by patrol-level personnel and once initiated is auto-adaptive to the required 
resources without bureaucratic halts for review, permission, or authorization. The web-
based system makes it easy for departments, jurisdictions and regions to coordinate their 
needs and understand the neighboring jurisdictions requirements prior to the crises.  Plans 
can be updated in real-time on the web as the environment changes or departments adjust 
to lessons learned.232 
ILEAS is also auto-adaptive in its general management structure.  The 
ILEAS governing board allows for unified and coordinated LE action across Illinois as 
each department is represented.  Each has a voice to support, adjust and oppose policy, 
plans and resource management decisions.  This board is what ties each department to the 
management direction of the consortium allowing for timely adjustments to individual 
department needs.   
d. Integration of Agencies Prior to Incident 
As previously stated, ILEAS consists of a strong central management 
organization linked by clear lines of communication to a network of decentralized 
executors.  These executors are linked to each other via emergency mutual aid plans, 
linked data information systems, a common communication package and a central ILEAS 
dispatch agency.  Agencies exercise response to stricken neighboring jurisdictions and 
are not strangers to one another before the emergency occurs.233  
ILEAS also underwrites specialized tactical deployment teams designed to 
provide special response capability to requesting jurisdictions.  These regional teams 
provide a platform to integrate departments as its team members are drawn from agencies 
throughout the region.234  As such, these team members bring the ideas and cultures of 
their departments with them and provide another avenue for inter-agency cooperation 
through mutual goals and understanding.  Although jurisdictions maintain autonomy, 
they are linked by numerous venues allowing them to perform in a networked fashion. 
                                                 




e. Administrative and Management Capacity 
The staff of ILEAS consists of seven full-time and twenty part-time 
personnel coupled with a governing board of twenty-one personnel.  The capacity of this 
management organization is leveraged by multiple integrated resource management tools 
that reach down to the jurisdiction level, a governing board and regional representatives 
that execute programs in the field along-side the departments they directly support.  An 
important element not found in NDMS or the US&R response system is that ILEAS has 
been given the authority to execute its mission.  NDMS and US&R achieve informal 
power or authority through the promise of resources; however, participating teams can 
opt out if it is in their best interest or their sponsoring organizations direct them to exit.  
Under the federal structure, there is division as the management system is operated by 
one organization and another owns the teams.  ILEAS’ informal authority is derived from 
participation by the 880 constituent departments all under one agreement brought 
together by equal representation.  Formal authority is derived from the Illinois 
Constitution, which designates ILEAS as a semi-government body.235 
f. Acceptance by the LE Community 
If ILEAS is such a good program, why have other states not developed a 
system like it?  The explanation may be a simple one: timing.  Executive Director of 
ILEAS, James Page, illustrates this point best.  The Illinois Association of Chief’s of 
Police and the Illinois Terrorism Task Force were interested in LE mutual aid and 
statewide response prior to 9/11 but could not get any traction on the idea.236  However, 
the events of 9/11 opened a window of opportunity within the state where all LE agencies 
were willing to cooperate as a single entity; thus, the enactment of ILEAS in 2002.  John 
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Typically, an idea has to have time to “ripen” and when the policy window opens, the 
idea can be transformed and enacted into public policy.237  In near textbook fashion, this 
is exactly what the Illinois LE community did with ILEAS.   
Other states have shown an interest in ILEAS; however, many may simply 
be on the wrong side of the policy window to do anything about it.  From the national 
perspective, the LEDT concept paper appears remarkably like the initial National Law 
Enforcement Rapid Response Team proposal written by Mr. Page, which is based upon 
the current ILEAS concept.  The LEDT concept has been accepted by all the major 
stakeholders within the U.S. LE community; if enacted, its roots will be solidly in 
ILEAS.   
g. Political Objections 
There does not appear to be any political objection to ILEAS in Illinois.  
ILEAS does not own LE forces nor does it initiate or dictate LE deployment on its own.  
This arrangement allows ILEAS to stay out of the debate regarding public safety versus 
private liberties.  ILEAS is a facilitator of the rules these organizations each agreed to and 
under which they operate.  The ILEAS management system is central in nature; however, 
all law enforcement actions are decentralized.  Since its creation in 2002, ILEAS still 
represents all sheriffs and police departments across the state.  If there were serious 
political objection, these organizations would likely have voted with their feet by now. 
2. Projected Outcome 
ILEAS is a superior LE management system for the state of Illinois.  If 
implemented at the national level, it would require execution of four key attributes in 
order to obtain the same level of success.  First, it would have to devise a national 
advisory and governing board to maintain its inclusiveness and representation.  Second, it 
would require a central management agency to consolidate and coordinate actions.  
FEMA would be the logical choice, as the central management agency, as it is resourced 
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for all-hazards emergency response and could eventually link other first responders in a 
unified national response.  Third, a common information management system would be 
required to tie local jurisdictions with regions and states to other states.  Like ILEAS, this 
system should include resource catalogues as well as emergency mutual aid plans tying 
jurisdictions to one another for prearranged and integrated response.  Finally, the national 
system should develop deployable LE response teams with specialized capability for 
response to regional disasters.  However, if local jurisdictions are completely tied across 
the nation and integrated by emergency mutual aid response plans, there should be a 
reduction in the number of national specialized teams required as regions would be more 
capable of providing an internal response to solve their own problems.  An organization 
structure such as this would provide a national response system versus mere management 
capacity to deploy teams. 
D. ALTERNATIVE THREE:  MILITARY DELIBERATE PLANNING 
MODEL 
1. Evaluative Criteria 
Without much doubt, the military management system is a classic machine 
bureaucracy:  hierarchical, centrally driven, with a strict chain of command.  However, it 
does not necessarily display many of the standard negative attributes of a machine 
bureaucracy, “destructive to the spirit of employees, overly rigid, inflexible, unable to 
adapt to change and a constant source of frustration to members of the public who deal 
with them.”238  In many respects, the military system acts opposite of these conditions 
perhaps due to its all-volunteer status.  As such, it is a beacon of admiration for how it 
operates, particularly in austere and fluid environments, similar to what the LEDT would 
experience.   
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After Hurricane Katrina, proposals were made by the President to use the military 
as the primary response element to catastrophic disasters.239  Given the sensitivity to 
maintain federalism and home rule, why would such a proposal be made?  A review of 
the following evaluative criteria may shed some light on this bold statement. 
a. Coordination 
The civilian community by far has more critical infrastructure and 
resources than the military; however, it is the military’s unique ability to coordinate and 
rapidly consolidate that makes it a more powerful organization.  The military operates an 
excellent coordination system through its highly developed chains of command, reporting 
protocols and sophisticated command and control mechanisms.  It is the hierarchical 
structure itself that ties otherwise disparate units together to mass resources effectively in 
order to provide a unified response.   
b. Shared Goals 
Military goals are determined and facilitated by a series of connected 
activities.  The President and the national command authority determine strategy and 
objectives for the nation.  Heads of the military services develop doctrine, strategy, 
objectives and goals to support accomplishment of the national strategy directly.  The 
directions of the military service chiefs cascade down to each successive organizational 
level that also develops strategy, objectives and goals dovetailing into the mission of the 
next higher organization.  It is through this system of cascading strategic planning that 
each unit within the military shares supporting goals from top to bottom.  However, 
overarching changes in national missions require time before shared goals are inculcated 
throughout the system.  Until this point is reached, missions are accomplished through 
disciplined adherence to the chain of command.  
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c. Structure of the System 
The military is hierarchical in nature and is arranged by functions, which 
allows for specific chains of command, specialization, standardization, use of standard 
operating procedures based upon formal rules and regulations and professionalization of 
employees.240  The military uses this form of organization structure to manage a 
geographically dispersed capability to deliver unified actions in crises environments.  
There are numerous experts in organizational design that believe organization by function 
is archaic, inflexible and obsolete such as Harold Seidman, John Carroll and Fredrick 
Kaiser to name a very few.241  However, for the military, it is this very structure that 
makes it a world-class responder.   
d. Integration of Agencies Prior to Incident 
Formal doctrine determines what branches of service or organization is 
responsible for specific mission areas.  This is followed by integration of supporting units 
through cascading strategy, objectives and goals facilitated by the chain of command.  
This system provides an advantage the civilian community does not enjoy, as civilian 
organizations must rely more on informal relationships and wills and desires of 
independent jurisdictions who have competing goals and interests. 
e. Administrative and Management Capacity 
The Department of Defense is the largest agency in the government.  The 
sheer size of the department drives formal protocols for planning, managing and 
administration.  The DoD’s administrative and management capacity allow and indeed 
require it to develop intricate operational plans and synchronized force packages to 
impose the nation’s will across the globe.  No state, local or private entity commands 
remotely similar resources and to this extent, the DoD’s unique scale may limit its value 
as a model for other organizations.   
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f. Acceptance by the LE Community 
Like the military, the LE community is organized by function as seen by 
the establishment of patrol divisions, investigation branches, SWAT and corrections 
functions within the departments.  The LE community also relies on chains of command, 
specialization, standardization, use of standard operating procedures, formal 
rules/regulations and professionalization of employees.  LE agencies are often thought of 
as para-military agencies for these reasons.  However, one of the main differences 
between the military and police departments is that the latter lacks a single central 
management system to tie geographically disperse departments together across the nation 
as the DoD does with its military branches and bases.   
Even with all the successes of this system and similarities between the 
military and LE community, there is little support for a national police force among LE 
practitioners and citizens as depicted in the on-going debate between public safety and 
personal liberty.  Additionally, the LE community enjoys and expects the autonomy to 
operate within their own jurisdictions.  However, based upon acceptance of the LEDT 
concept by major LE stakeholders, there appears to be a desire to change the current 
response structure starting with consolidating resources and development of policies and 
procedures to create a more structured and unified regional emergency response 
capability.   
g. Political Objections  
Despite the success of the U.S. military and its structures, nationalization 
of the civilian police force is a nonviable alternative in the United States.  Additionally 
there is significant debate amongst organizational design experts as to the efficacy of 
central and hierarchical structures versus networked and decentralized structures.  The 
development of a centralized approach to manage deployable teams is a delicate 
proposition.  State and local jurisdictions may view such a move as an attempt to control 
their resources.   
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2.   Projected Outcome 
The military management system has great applicability to U.S. law enforcement.  
However, such a system adopted in total would have a negative impact on the ideals of 
American federalism and would be unlikely to work as it could never be dominantly 
controlled to the degree the DoD does to ensure its success.  Any allowance for county 
option or arbitrary participation would defeat the purpose and ability of such a system. 
There are individual components of the military management system, if adopted, 
could markedly improve response capability. The first is deliberate planning against most 
likely threats coupled with pre-assigned force packaging to increase the speed and quality 
of a regional LE response.  The second is a standard command and control architecture 
linking the deployment authority to departments such as the ILEAS dispatch center as it 
does for Illinois coupled with a shared information management system to tie resources 
together. 
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There are two overarching principles that must be taken into consideration when 
formulating LEDT management options.  First, the U.S. system of government employs 
some forms of inefficiency to protect against abuse from a central power.  During a 
lecture at Colombia University in 1959, President Harry S. Truman said, “Whenever you 
have an efficient government you have a dictatorship.”242  This outlook has also proven 
to be the crux of problems affecting emergency response.  Given today’s threats and 
increased complexity of response, how inefficient can the United States afford the 
government to be in exchange for this protection?  Should the inefficiency apply equally 
across the board and to the same degree in all government programs?  Second, the 
public’s willingness to adjust or trade civil liberties for centralized efficiency is likely to 
be formed on a sliding scale based upon recent events.  Immediately after 9/11, 
Americans were much more willing to stand in long airport lines, endure questioning and 
physical searches in trade for increased security.243  With the passage of time, however, 
citizens become less willing to give up or adjust their liberties. Narrowing of the policy 
window is a significant factor that will shape available options to form the National 
LEDT program.   
Overall, a balance must be found within the dilemma of checking governmental 
power and effective delivery of public service.  As a policy proposal, the National LEDT 
system must answer effectiveness and efficiency concerns while staying within the 
bounds of the American federalist construct in order to be acceptable.   
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Law enforcement planners clearly indicate, through the LEDT concept, their 
desire to increase the capacity to bolster stricken jurisdictions by deployment of outside 
LE resources.  However, the ability to achieve this desire goes beyond simply massing 
people and resources to be transported to the disaster area.  The larger issue is the 
development of a structure capable of managing such a force daily to ensure readiness 
and effective employment of teams when needed.   
The LEDT concept paper extensively cites tenets of both DMAT and US&R 
teams.  There is no indication LEDT planners reviewed the viability of these management 
systems.  The LEDT proposal’s design is, in fact, more decentralized than both NDMS 
and US&R Response systems.244  As history and the evaluative criteria show, these 
systems lacked the ability to coordinate, struggled with shared goals and lacked the 
administrative and management capacity to manage teams effectively under their 
purview.  The current LEDT proposal appears to ignore the lessons of NDMS and the 
US&R Response System, if these lessons were known at all.   
Complex policy problems rarely lend themselves to simple solutions.  None of the 
evaluated alternative management systems reviewed in this thesis provides a stand-alone 
template for formation of the LEDT management system.  However, the smart practices 
and obstacles outlined in Chapter IV should act as guideposts in formation of the LEDT 
management system.   
As Florence Heffron points out, “…values intrinsic to democratic political theory 
require government to be responsive, representative and responsible.”245  By following 
Heffron’s edicts and the previously identified guideposts, LE planners may design a 
system that works both in the field and is acceptable to the LE community and the public.  
The following are general propositions for consideration. 
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1.   Achieving Responsiveness 
The LEDT management system should be centrally housed in FEMA rather than 
straddle three different management agencies.  This structure would shorten coordination 
lanes between deployable stakeholders while streamlining the number of steps and 
organizations involved with deployment management.  This structure directly answers 
key complaints regarding coordination after Katrina. 
To further increase responsiveness, a planning cell should be developed to “war 
plan” major incidents against target cities by category of size to develop response 
templates as is done under the military model.  These templates should be further refined 
by the cities themselves to add the requisite details and coordination points.  Like ILEAS, 
these templates would act as the mandatory emergency mutual aid plans and would 
provide the basis for rapid LEDT deployment and efficient and effective use of resources 
upon arrival.   
2.   Achieving Representative Status 
A governing board comprised of regional representatives should be developed to 
guide FEMA’s management of these teams.  FEMA does not own the responding 
agencies; therefore, a power equalization strategy of shared power would be more 
acceptable and more likely to affect the necessary change than a top-down approach.246  
ILEAS provides a successful example of this management strategy and should be studied 
further for potential implementation.   
3.   Achieving Responsibility 
As found in NDMS and US&R management systems, obtaining program 
compliance without authority is problematic.  Housing the proposed LEDT management 
system within FEMA alone does not give it legal authority over deployable LE elements.  
However, the provision of funding and resourcing coupled with inclusion in the 
management process through the regional governing board concept could prove valuable 
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in gaining compliance with shared goals.  ILEAS provides a working example of this 
construct and it proves this approach can be very effective.  A standardization and 
evaluation panel comprised of LEDT managers, subject matter experts and FEMA 
representatives should be formed to ensure teams comply with program standards.  This 
team would aid considerably in achieving shared responsibility.  The US&R management 
committee proved to be an effective model in this regard.  
4.   LEDT Management 
LEDT management will only be as effective as the information systems it 
employs.  Again, ILEAS provides a positive example of how information systems can be 
used not only to manage and maintain status of teams but also to form response plans, 
provide access to shared resource databases, and standardize training and operations 
information.  The LEDT management system must not become a pedestal headquarters 
function that only pulls information.  It must push information and facilitate collaboration 
between participating departments in order for it to be successful in a landscape where it 
has no legal authority and does not physically own the assets.   
These recommendations provide the beginning of a structure to employ Henry 
Fayol’s time-tested principles of management:  centralization, unity of command, unity 
of effort, division of work and order.247  The proposals also maintain the tenet of 
American federalism though decentralized execution by state and local jurisdictions 
facilitated by representation via the governing board and the information management 
and resource sharing systems. 
C. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
The largest obstacle to implementation may come from within the LE community 
itself.  Inability to agree on an approach that would provide the required autonomy and 
authority to marshal and manage regional resources effectively is likely given the 
historical decentralized structure of LE. 
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Additionally, time is not on the side of LE planners.  The further removed from 
the events of 9/11 and Katrina, the smaller the policy window is for implementation of a 
methodology to transform the current response structure.  It is likely, as more time 
passes; that LE practitioners and their political leaders will feel less threatened by the 
potential of a catastrophic event occurring in their jurisdiction, and therefore, will be less 
likely to embrace a transformational change particularly if they perceive any loss of 
autonomy.248  Congress for its part is likely to become increasing concerned about the 
efficacy and cost of such a program. 
D. IMPLICATIONS  
Status quo is not a viable option given past response problems.  LE reform should 
not be hobbled by old fears or outdated paradigms and structures.  The proposed smart 
practices and guideposts present adjustments to form a robust system to ensure delivery 
of LE capability to stricken areas.  Furthermore, the proposals maintain the traditions of 
states’ rights and home rule.  Failure to move in a new direction will require the LE 
community to attempt to squeeze effectiveness and efficiency out of outdated approaches, 
a recipe for diminishing returns going forward.   
E. WAY AHEAD 
Law enforcement planners are merely scratching the surface of a larger problem 
in the United States; lack of a synchronized response.  The Incident Command System 
and the National Incident Management System work to unify command and control once 
teams arrive; however, before that point teams are managed and deployed within their 
functional stovepipes.  Simply, there is not a synchronized national response of the 
various first response capabilities.   
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Follow-on research should be conducted to facilitate revamping the nation’s 
disparate emergency response system to consolidate and network a civil defense 
configuration capable of facilitating integrated response from all first responder 
communities.  The template for such research exists in the military’s combined arms 
doctrine operationalized via the joint multiagency task force.   
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